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Quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) is an encryption method that allows quantum com-
putation to be performed on one party’s private data with the program provided by another party,
without revealing much information about the data nor about the program to the opposite party.
It is known that information-theoretically-secure QHE for circuits of unrestricted size would re-
quire exponential resources, and efficient computationally-secure QHE schemes for polynomial-sized
quantum circuits have been constructed. In this paper we first propose a QHE scheme for a type
of circuits of polynomial depth, based on the rebit quantum computation formalism. The scheme
keeps the restricted type of data perfectly secure. We then propose a QHE scheme for a larger class
of polynomial-depth quantum circuits, which has partial data privacy. Both schemes have good
circuit privacy. We also propose an interactive QHE scheme with asymptotic data privacy, however,
the circuit privacy is not good, in the sense that the party who provides the data could cheat and
learn about the circuit. We show that such cheating would generally affect the correctness of the
evaluation or cause deviation from the protocol. Hence the cheating can be caught by the opposite
party in an interactive scheme with embedded verifications. Such scheme with verification has a
minor drawback in data privacy. Finally, we show some methods which achieve some nontrivial
level of data privacy and circuit privacy without resorting to allowing early terminations, in both
the QHE problem and in secure evaluation of classical functions. The entanglement and classical
communication costs in these schemes are polynomial in the circuit size and the security parameter
(if any).
I. INTRODUCTION
As quantum computers are difficult to build, a practical way for doing quantum computation is using the client-
server model. The quantum computer is placed at the server, and the clients may have limited quantum capabilities.
The client and the server may want to hide some information about their program or data from each other. This is
part of the reason why security in bipartite quantum computing is of interest. Bipartite quantum computation may
also be related to or directly implement some classical or quantum cryptographic tasks. Two problems in bipartite
quantum computing have attracted a lot of attention. One of them is blind quantum computing, and the other is
quantum homomorphic encryption, the main topic of this paper.
In classical cryptography, homomorphic encryption (HE) is an encryption scheme that allows computation to be
performed (effectively on the plaintext after decryption) while having access only to the ciphertext. A fully homo-
morphic encryption (FHE) scheme allows for any computation to be performed in such fashion. The known schemes
[1, 2] are based on computational assumptions. Quantum (fully) homomorphic encryption (QHE and QFHE respec-
tively) allows (universal) quantum computation to be performed without accessing the unencrypted data. Schemes
for quantum homomorphic encryption [3–11] allow two stages of communication, with some initial shared entangled
state. The requirements are that the final computation result is correct, and the data and the final computation
result are known only to the data-provider, who learns little about the circuit performed beyond what can be deduced
from the result of the computation itself. There is no limit to the quantum capabilities of any party. We regard
interactive QHE schemes as those schemes with similar security characteristics as the usual QHE schemes, but allows
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2many rounds of communication. We allow any party to abort during the interactive protocol.
It is known that information-theoretically-secure (ITS) QHE for circuits of unrestricted size necessarily incurs
exponential overhead [9, 12, 13]. For the special case of unrestricted quantum input states and perfect data privacy,
a stronger lower bound is stated in [14]. Some computationally-secure QHE schemes for polynomial-sized quantum
circuits have been constructed [7, 8, 10].
In this paper, we firstly introduce a QHE scheme for a restricted type of circuits (Scheme 1). It keeps the real
product input state perfectly secure, and the circuit privacy is optimal up to a constant factor. We then propose a
QHE scheme for a larger class of polynomial-depth quantum circuits, which has partial data privacy and near-optimal
circuit privacy. The entanglement and classical communication costs in both schemes scale linearly with the product
of input size and circuit depth.
We then introduce a partially-secure interactive QHE scheme for polynomial-sized circuits, which is Scheme 4 in
Sec. V. It is independent from the two schemes above. It uses a subprocedure (Scheme 3) for computing classical
linear polynomials. The Scheme 4 has asymptotic data privacy, but the circuit privacy is not good. We then propose
an enhanced version with embedded verifications, in which Bob, who provides the circuit, may choose to abort if the
messages returned from Alice during the protocol do not pass his verifications. Such enhanced scheme has both quite
satisfactory data privacy and circuit privacy: it leaks a constant amount of information about the data, where the
constant is determined by the security requirements; and the circuit privacy is quite good since the cheating by Alice
is likely to be caught.
In Sec. VI, we propose a variant of Scheme 3, denoted as Scheme 6, which achieves some nontrivial level of data
privacy and circuit privacy. The degree of data privacy does not satisfy the IND-CPA criterion, but for some range
of parameters, it is good when the input is a priori uniformly random in the other party’s view. There are also
other variants which interpolates between Scheme 3 and Scheme 6. In Sec. VII, we propose Scheme 7 for computing
classical linear polynomials. It is based on the idea of information locking by quantum techniques, but also contains
some idea from Scheme 6. It generally achieves better security than Scheme 6. In Sec. VIII, we present methods for
combined use of the schemes for evaluating classical linear polynomials, and mention some application to interactive
QHE with limited circuit depth. In Sec. IX, we present some interactive protocols that make use of the previously
proposed schemes for evaluating general classical functions with some nontrivial level of security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we review some literature results. In Sec. III we will introduce
some preliminary knowledge. Secs. IV presents the two QHE schemes which are secure for some types of data and
some types of circuits. Sec. V contains an interactive QHE scheme and its enhanced version. The Secs. VI and VII
contain variants of Scheme 3. Sec. VIII contains methods for combined use of the schemes for evaluating classical
linear polynomials. Sec. IX contains some methods for evaluating general classical functions with some nontrivial
level of security. Sec. X contains the conclusion and some open problems.
II. REVIEW OF PAST RESULTS
In the following we put our work in the context of literature results on quantum homomorphic encryption and
related problems.
Blind quantum computing (BQC) is a task in which Alice knows both the data and program but can only do limited
quantum operations, and the main part of the computation is to be carried out by Bob, who learns neither the data
nor much about the program. The output is to be known to Alice but not Bob (this is different from QHE, in which
the party with the program does not know the output). Broadbent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi presented a BQC scheme
[15] using the measurement-based quantum computing model. An experimental demonstration is in [16]. There are
other BQC schemes based on the circuit model [17], or the ancilla-driven model [18]. The possibility of Alice being a
classical client (allowing partial leakage of the client’s information) is discussed in [19].
In Yu et al [14], it is shown that the condition of perfect data privacy implies an information localization phe-
nomenon, and this puts restrictions on the possible forms of QHE schemes and their complexity. The Theorem 1 and
Corollary 1 of [14] are for the case that input states are unrestricted. For restricted input states such as real product
3states, the Scheme 1 in the current work and the scheme in [9] provide examples for which the above statements do
not apply.
Newman and Shi [12] (see also [13]), concurrently with Lai and Chung [9], showed that ITS-QFHE schemes require
communication cost (including entanglement cost) that is at least exponential in the number of input qubits, where
“ITS” allows a negligible amount of data leakage. This is based on the work of Nayak [20].
On computing two-party classical functions with quantum circuits, Lo [21] studied the data privacy in the case that
the output is on one party only, and both parties know the function. The security of two-party quantum computation
for fixed classical function with both parties knowing the outcome has been studied by Buhrman et al [22].
There is a line of work on partially-ITS QHE, which are sometimes limited to certain types of circuits. In the
scheme of Rohde et al [3], only a logarithmic amount of information about the data is hidden, and the type of circuit
is limited to Boson sampling. Tan et al [5, 11] presented QHE schemes that allow some types of quantum circuits
and hides only partial information (but more than that in [3]) about the data. Ouyang et al [6] presented a scheme
that hides almost all information about the data, but can only perform Clifford gates and a constant number of
non-Clifford gates. In the scheme in [6], the party with initial data could cheat by replacing the mixed qubits by pure
qubits in some particular input state to gain partial knowledge about the Clifford gates applied, without affecting the
correctness of the evaluation. The degree of circuit privacy is related to the size of the code, thus it is in a tradeoff
with data privacy.
The following results are based on the existence of computationally-secure classical homomorphic encryption
schemes. Broadbent and Jeffery [7] presented two computationally-secure QFHE schemes that are relatively effi-
cient for polynomial-sized quantum circuits with limited use of T gates (and arbitrary use of Clifford gates). A
compact QFHE scheme was proposed by Dulek, Schaffner and Speelman [8]. Its complexity of decryption (but not
the overall computation and communication costs) could be independent of the size of the circuit to be evaluated, by
choosing the classical HE scheme in it appropriately. Mahadev [10] presented a quantum leveled fully homomorphic
encryption scheme using classical homomorphic encryption schemes with certain properties. The client holding the
initial data in the scheme is almost classical except for the sending and receiving of quantum states at the beginning
and at the end. Alagic et al devised a computationally-secure QFHE scheme with verification [23], where the client
is similarly almost classical (and completely classical in the case of classical input and output).
Verification of quantum computations is an interesting problem on its own, but the study of this problem has been
closely related to that of blind quantum computing. The fact that it is related to QHE has been hinted in [10, 23, 24].
Usually, the verification problem involves a quantum prover and a quantum verifier, and the prover tries to convince
the verifier that a quantum computation has been done as planned. Most studies assume the verifier to have some
quantum capabilities [17, 25–28]. There are also significant progress in using a classical or almost classical verifier
[23, 24, 28, 29]. The protocols in [28] show that verification can be done after the computation is done, while not
necessarily achieving blindness of the computation.
Some schemes for delegated quantum computation have been proposed [4, 30, 31]. In their original form, they
usually have good data privacy but are not necessarily strong in circuit privacy. The Supplementary Note 1 of [4]
contains a method based on so-called “universal circuits” to achieve blind quantum computing (hiding the information
about the circuit which is initially on the same party as the data) but this does not make it useful for the QHE problem,
since the input data and the program are on opposite parties in QHE, unlike in BQC. It is pointed out in [15] (with
details in [32]) that the protocol in [30] can be modified to become a blind quantum computing protocol having circuit
privacy. This method is also not useful for QHE.
Some lower bounds on the length of classical encryption key in an ITS QHE scheme can be found in [33].
III. PRELIMINARIES
First, we give a definition for quantum homomorphic encryption. Note the Encryption algorithm below absorbs
both the key generation algorithm and the encryption algorithm in [7]. The measurements are explicitly allowed.
4Definition 1. A quantum homomorphic encryption scheme (QHE) E contains the following three algorithms, where
λ is the security parameter, and T refers to a quantum circuit which may contain measurements and quantum gates
controlled by classical functions of measurement outcomes, φ is an initial entangled resource state shared by Alice
and Bob, and σ is the input data state of Alice.
1. Encryption algorithm EncryptE(λ, σ, φ). The algorithm outputs some quantum state Π called the ciphertext.
The reduced state of Π on Alice’s and Bob’s systems are denoted Πa and Πb, respectively.
2. Evaluation algorithm EvaluateE(λ, T,Πb) that does a computation T on Πb without decryption.
3. Decryption algorithm DecryptE(λ,Πa,Π′b), where Π
′
b := EvaluateE(λ, T,Πb).
A scheme is correct if for any input state σ with associated ciphertext Π, and any circuit T chosen from a set of
permitted quantum circuits TE , DecryptE(λ,Πa,Π′b) = T (σ) (up to a possible global phase). A scheme with perfect
data privacy is one such that Bob cannot learn anything about the input σ, except the size of the input, from Πb. The
requirement of circuit privacy refers to that Alice does not learn anything about the circuit performed beyond what
can be deduced from the result of the computation itself. In actual protocols we seem only able to approach this goal.
A quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE) scheme is one that is homomorphic for all circuits, i.e. the set
TE is the set of all unitary quantum circuits. For approximate data privacy in QHE, there is a q-IND-CPA criterion
[7] which is related to the indistinguishability of encoded states. We regard interactive QHE schemes as those have
similar security characteristics as the usual QHE schemes, but allow many rounds of communication. Naturally, any
one party may choose to abort during the interactive protocol (but we exclude that in the scheme in Sec VI). In
Sec. VI, we encounter a new criterion for data privacy in (interactive) QHE schemes in terms of mutual information
for uniformly random inputs.
Here is a brief note about data privacy. It is well known [see for example Theorem 1(ii) of [34]] that if a unitary is
exactly and deterministically implemented on all possible pure input states, no information about the input is leaked
to the environment (which can be understood as the opposite party in our setting). Hence, data privacy is sort of
trivial in some cases, but becomes an interesting problem when data privacy is more important than the correctness of
computation, or when the computations are not restricted to unitaries, or when the type of input states is restricted
(say real product inputs only). The QHE Schemes 3 and 4 in this paper satisfy that the correctness of evaluation
in general implies both data privacy and circuit privacy, and since arbitrary measurements can be done at the end,
the computations here are not limited to unitaries. (The expression “in general” means excluding some classes of
computations in which the output contains all information about the circuit, e.g. the special case in Scheme 3 where
the polynomial has only one term.) As far as we know, this phenomenon of “correctness implies privacy” is not
previously known for non-unitary computations, and is thus a strong point of our schemes.
Denote the Pauli operators by X = σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σy =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, Z = σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
. The set of
Clifford gates is defined as the set of unitaries U satisfying UPU † = ±P ′, where P and P ′ are tensor products of
Pauli operators. The n-qubit Clifford gates form a group called Clifford group. Since we ignore the global phase here,
the size of the n-qubit Clifford group is 18 of an expression given in [35]. In particular, the one-qubit Clifford group
has 24 elements. Let the rotations of angle θ about the three axes of the Bloch sphere be Ry(θ) =
(
cos θ2 − sin θ2
sin θ2 cos
θ
2
)
,
Rz(θ) =
(
1 0
0 eiθ
)
, and Rx(θ) =
(
cos θ2 −i sin θ2
−i sin θ2 cos θ2
)
. Let T =
(
1 0
0 ei
pi
4
)
, H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
, and P =
(
1 0
0 i
)
. Any
one-qubit Clifford gate (ignoring global phase, same below) can be decomposed using products of Ry(
π
2 ) (proportional
to ei
pi
4
σy ) and Rz(
π
2 ) (proportional to e
ipi
4
σz ) in different sequences. The n-qubit Clifford gates can be decomposed into
products of one-qubit Clifford gates and the CNOT (controlled-σx) gate. The Clifford gates and the T gate together
form a universal set of gates for quantum computing. For more about universal sets of gates, see [36]. In this paper,
the term “EPR pair” refers to two qubits in the state 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉). Let |+〉 denote 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), and |−〉 denote
1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉).
5We shall adopt the rebit quantum computation formalism in [37] in our schemes. (See [38] for more about simulating
the usual quantum circuit or Hamiltonian within the rebit formalism.) States of complex amplitudes can be represented
by states of real amplitudes with only one extra qubit. Let there be an ancillary qubit with an orthonormal basis
{|R〉, |I〉}. The following non-unitary encoding is used in [37]:
(a+ bi)|0〉+ (c+ di)|1〉 −→ a|0〉|R〉+ b|0〉|I〉+ c|1〉|R〉+ d|1〉|I〉, (1)
where a, b, c, d are real numbers. When there are n qubits in the initial input, only one ancillary qubit is needed. This
ancillary qubit will be called the “phase qubit” in this paper. For Scheme 1 in this paper, we only need to deal with
real input states, and in this case the initial encoding is trivial.
Next, we introduce how to apply gates on such representation. A unitary rotation Rz(θ) in the Z basis of an original
qubit is mapped to a controlled-Ry(2θ) on the real (i.e. original) qubit and the phase qubit, with the real qubit as
the control. A unitary rotation in the Y basis of an original qubit is still the same gate on the original qubit, and no
action is needed on the phase qubit. An entangling two-qubit gate F (π2 ) [which is controlled-Ry(π)] is implemented
by the same gate on the original qubits, and no action is needed on the phase qubit. These gates are all real (meaning
that their matrix elements are real), and they can generate all possible unitary operations on any number of qubits,
hence quantum computation in this particular representation can be done using only real gates. Let us denote three
gates (on the logical qubit) Rz(
π
2 ), Ry(
π
2 ) and F (
π
2 ) as forming the gate set S0. These three gates can generate the
Clifford group on any number of logical qubits, and each of them can be implemented using real gates in the rebit
formalism.
In the following paragraphs, we show how an unknown logical one-qubit Clifford gate can be implemented up to
a phase by just performing the one-qubit gates in S0 and the uncertain gates in the set {I,Ry(π2 ), σy ,Ry(3π2 )}. We
shall call the latter gate the uncertain Ry(
kπ
2 ) gate. The uncertain Ry(
kπ
2 ) gate on Alice’s side is generated using the
gadget shown in Fig. 1 which initially contains an EPR pair shared by Alice and Bob. Alice performs a controlled-iσy
gate with her part of the EPR pair as the control and the data qubit (assumed to be real) as the target. Then she
performs a Ry(
π
2 ) gate on her qubit in the EPR pair and measures it in the Z basis (with basis states being |0〉 or |1〉).
Bob performs a Ry(
jπ
2 ) gate and does a measurement in the Z basis, where j ∈ {0, 1}. The choice of j determines
the gate applied on Alice’s qubit up to a correction Ry(π) = −iσy and a phase. Such correction can be commuted
through the Clifford gates performed later with some Pauli operators as corrections.
Inspired by an H-gate gadget construction in [27], we give a construction using Rz(
π
2 ) and Ry(
jπ
2 ) for some integers
j to implement one of the four gates Rz(
kπ
2 ), where k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. We have
Rx(
π
2
) = e−iπ/4Ry(
π
2
)Rz(
π
2
)Ry(−π
2
), (2)
Rz(−kπ
2
) = eiγkRx(−π
2
)Ry(
kπ
2
)Rx(
π
2
), for k = 0, 1, 2, 3, (3)
where γk are real constants, and Rx(
π
2 ) =
1√
2
(
1 −i
−i 1
)
. Noticing that Rx(−π2 ) = −
[
Rx(
π
2 )
]3
, the uncertain Rz(
kπ
2 )
gate can be implemented using the uncertain Ry(
kπ
2 ) gate and the gate Rz(
π
2 ) which is in S0. Since Rz(
π
2 ) and Ry(
π
2 )
generate the single-qubit Clifford group, the two types of uncertain gates generate the same group.
We also notice that a Ty = Ry(
π
4 ) gate can be implemented using the same gadget. Alice’s action is still the same as
before. Bob does some gate Ry(
jπ
4 ) with j = 1 or 3 before doing a Z-basis measurement. The choice of j depends on
Alice and Bob’s previous measurement results. All previous gadgets and fixed gates give rise to some Pauli operators
known to Bob (which are to be corrected by Alice later), and these Pauli operators cause some Pauli operator Z on
Bob’s qubit in the gadget, which is corrected by Bob’s choice of gate before measurement in the gadget. Generally,
Bob may implement a Ry(θ) gate for any real θ, by suitably choosing his gate before measurement in the gadget. We
omit the details here, since this is a special case of the more general multi-qubit Y -diagonal gate in Scheme 1 below.
6|ψ〉
∣∣Φ+
〉
iσy
Ry(
π
2
) m
Ry(
jπ
4
) s
FIG. 1: The gadget for implementing Y-axis rotations Ry(
kπ
2
) for integer k, or the Ty = Ry(
π
4
) gate on the first qubit up to
a possible correction Ry(π) = −iσy and a possible phase depending on j and the measurement results. The entangled state∣
∣Φ+
〉
= 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉). For implementing Ry(
kπ
2
) with integer k, the integer j is 0 or 2, dependent only on the desired gate;
for implementing the Ty , the integer j is 1 or 3, which depends on Alice’s measurement outcome and the previous gates and
measurement outcomes in the circuit. In Scheme 1, the last qubit is on Bob’s side and the other two qubits are on Alice’s side.
IV. TWO SCHEMES BASED ON REBITS
(1) About Scheme 1. The Scheme 1 is for a restricted type of circuits with restricted types of input states. The
scheme uses the rebit quantum computation techniques in [37]. In the following, we denote the number of input data
qubits as n.
The input state for Scheme 1 can be a product real state, but it can also be slightly more general: a product state of
one-qubit real states on n− 1 qubits with a logical qubit state encoded in the rebit form (1), where the physical qubit
for that exceptional logical qubit is the first data qubit. The output of Scheme 1 is of the form of (1). If the required
output of Scheme 1 is classical, we only need to measure the qubits except the phase qubit to get the outcome. There
might be other applications in which there are both real and imaginary parts in the output state, and the wanted part
is real. Then we may still have some probability of success: do a measurement of the phase qubit in the {|R〉, |I〉}
basis, and if the outcome corresponds to |R〉, we then measure the remaining qubits to get the result. If an output
state with complex amplitudes is required, we may measure the phase qubit in the {(|R〉+ |I〉)/√2, (|R〉 − |I〉)/√2}
basis, and if the result is the first one, we know the output state is correct.
The Scheme 1 allows continuous families of multi-qubit gates to be performed using relatively few gadgets. Bob
is required to be able to perform more general operations than single-qubit measurements. The ability to perform
two-qubit gates and single-qubit measurements is enough, but for better efficiency, he should do gates on more than
two qubits.
Each layer of the circuit in the scheme implements some Y -diagonal unitary. Note that Y -diagonal unitaries on
multiple qubits are not necessarily real, and the scheme is limited to implementing those real Y -diagonal unitaries.
This is to guarantee the satisfaction of the requirement in rebit computation that the physical states are real. A class
of examples of a three-qubit real Y -diagonal gate is U = cos(θ)I⊗ I⊗ I+sin(θ)Ry(π)⊗Ry(π)⊗Ry(π), where θ is real.
The implementation of a Y -diagonal unitary uses the group-based protocol of remote implementation of unitary
operators in [39]. Such protocol is derived from the protocol for implementation of double-group unitaries on two
parties [34]. The double-group unitary protocol is a bipartite version of a group-based local quantum computing
scheme [40], with additional analysis in the case of projective representations. In the current work, we only deal with
the simple case of ordinary representation of a group, and the group is Abelian: it is the K-fold direct product of the
C2 group (the group with two elements), denoted as C
K
2 . In Scheme 1, K is the number of qubits involved in the
logical Y -diagonal unitary. The paper [39] contains the detailed steps for the remote unitary protocol for the case of
ordinary representation of a group. In Scheme 1, all K qubits are on Alice’s side. The unitary operators used in the
current case are
⊗K
i=1 σ
ai
y,i, where ai ∈ {0, 1}, and the subscript i means the gate acts on qubit i. The target unitary
U (on K data qubits) is diagonal in the Y axis, so it can be expanded using such a set of unitary operators:
U =
∑
f
c(f)V (f), (4)
where f is a group element in CK2 , and can be represented using a binary string of length K, consisting of the bits
ai: f = (a1, . . . , aK). The unitary V (f) is of the form
⊗K
i=1 σ
ai
y,i. The coefficients cf appear in the unitary matrix C
7in the remote unitary scheme. From the equation (45) in [34], the matrix C is defined using (ignoring phases since
we are dealing with ordinary representations here)
Cg,f = c(g
−1f), (5)
where g−1 and f are group elements, and their product is the group multiplication. When each element is represented
using a binary string of length K as mentioned above, the group multiplication is just the addition modulo 2 on each
position of the vector. The corrections are V (g)†. In the current case, it amounts to I or σy [equivalent to Ry(π)
up to a global phase] on each qubit. It is shown in [40] that when U is unitary and that the {V (f)} is an ordinary
representation, it is guaranteed that there exists at least one C matrix that is unitary. Further, if the {V (f)} is a
linearly independent set (which is true for the current case), then C is unique. These statements are extended in [34]
to the case of projective representations.
Some note about a particular step in the scheme: Bob’s P or P† gates on his qubit in each gadget are the product
of two gates: one of them is Z or I, which is a correction according to Alice’s measurement outcome, and the other
is a fixed P† gate to correct for the phase i in the controlled-iσy gate in the gadget. Bob’s such gates can also be
absorbed into his unitary C.
The entanglement and classical communication costs in Scheme 1 scale linearly with the product of the input size
and the circuit depth. For data privacy in Scheme 1, we have the following theorem, with the proof in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. When Scheme 1 is used for almost-commuting circuits with input state of the type specified in the
scheme, the input data is perfectly secure.
A statement about the circuit privacy in Scheme 1 is in Theorem 4 below. The circuit privacy is already optimal up
to a constant factor, since Alice can always learn O(n) bits of information about the circuit by looking at her output.
We note that there is a simplification of the scheme, using a method from [9]: for the last n− 1 data qubits, Alice
could choose to apply possible Ry(π) masks on them and send them to Bob before the protocol starts. In this way,
the ancillary qubits for those data qubits can be saved. At the end of the protocol, Bob sends these qubits back,
and Alice can recover this part of the output by undoing the Ry(π) masks. An alternative way of simplification is by
combining some gate gadgets so that each of the last n− 1 data qubits uses one gate gadget only.
(2) About Scheme 2. Based on Scheme 1, we propose the following Scheme 2 which works for a large class of
polynomial-depth circuits. Its data privacy is only partial. Its circuit privacy is similar to that in Scheme 1.
The entanglement and classical communication costs in the two schemes scale linearly with the product of the input
size and the circuit depth. The circuit in Scheme 2 only consists of products of real Y -diagonal unitaries performed by
Bob and some fixed type of unitaries performed by Alice. Numerical evidence suggests that whenever n > 1 (where
n is the number of data qubits), the type of the allowed circuits at the logical level is not arbitrary. This is confirmed
by Theorem 3 below. But the scheme at least allows a large class of unitary circuits. The data privacy in Scheme 2
is partial. From the proof of Theorem 1, it can be found that the two input states of all |0〉 and all |1〉 on the data
qubits (with the phase qubit in the same initial state |0〉) cannot be distinguished by Bob. More generally, we have
the following theorem, with the proof in Appendix A.
Theorem 2. (i) Suppose two input states in Scheme 2 satisfy that each is a product state across the bipartition
between the n data qubits and the phase qubit, and they are related to each other by a Ry(π) on each data qubit and a
Ry(θ) on the phase qubit, where θ is any real number, then Bob cannot distinguish these two input states at all.
(ii) In Scheme 2, if n is odd, the following logical qubit is perfectly secure: it is composed by encoding |0〉 and |1〉 into
|0〉⊗n and |1〉⊗n, respectively, on the data qubits, and the phase qubit is that in Scheme 2. The first n qubits of the
two encoded states could also be any computational-basis state and X⊗n acting on such state.
It is interesting to note that Theorem 2(ii) does not hold for the case of even n, even if we replace the “logical
qubit” with “logical rebit”. For example, when n = 2, the two input states 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)|0〉 and 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)|0〉
(where the last |0〉 is the input state of the phase qubit) can be distinguished perfectly by Bob with a constant-depth
circuit. This is because Ry(π) on an even number of qubits is not equal to the logical Ry(π) under the encoding in
8Scheme 1 QHE for almost-commuting circuits with product real input
The type of allowed circuits: an almost-commuting circuit. The logical circuit contains one or more real Y -diagonal
unitaries which act on subsets of data qubits, interspersed with Rz(
jπ
2
) (j = 1, 3) on the first data qubit only. This implies
that in the physical circuit, there may be multiple uses of the gate gadget on each data qubit, and the only other gates are
the two-qubit controlled-Ry(jπ) on only one of the data qubits and the phase qubit.
The type of allowed input states: a product real state, or with the first data qubit replaced by a complex qubit encoded
in the rebit form (1).
1. Alice and Bob initially share some EPR pairs. Alice prepares the classical input state in the data qubits. Alice uses
an ancillary qubit to be used as the phase qubit. It is assumed that both parties know the general form and the fixed
one-qubit gates in the desired logical circuit, except that the details of the Y -diagonal unitaries are known only to Bob.
2. Alice implements the fixed gates and her part of the gate gadgets. The logical Rz(
jπ
2
) (j = 1, 3) gates are implemented
using the controlled-Ry(jπ) gate on the real data qubit and her phase qubit. For a real Y -diagonal unitary acting on
one or more qubits, it is implemented with the help of some gate gadgets (each on one data qubit) similar to the one in
Fig. 1 but with Bob’s operations modified. Each gadget initially contains an EPR pair of qubits: a on Alice’s side, and
b on Bob’s side. Alice performs a local controlled-iσy gate with the qubit a as the control, and the real data qubit as
the target. She then does a Ry(
π
2
) gate followed by a Z-basis measurement on the qubit a. She sends Bob all available
measurement outcomes.
3. Bob receives Alice’s message. He maintains a list of Pauli corrections for the data qubits and Alice’s phase qubit, and
initially they are all I. For each Y -diagonal unitary which may act on multiple qubits, he does the following: for each
gadget, if Alice’s measurement outcome in this gadget corresponds to |0〉, he does a P gate on his qubit in the gadget;
otherwise he does a P† gate on this qubit. When there are Z or X in his list of Pauli corrections, he also does Z gates
on the relevant qubits in the gadgets. He then performs a unitary transform C given in Eq. (5) which acts jointly on all
his qubits in the relevant gate gadgets. He then does a measurement in the Z basis on each of the transformed qubits.
According to the measurement results, he updates his list of Pauli corrections [Ry(π) for each measurement outcome 1].
He updates the list when passing each fixed gate or later Y -diagonal unitaries in the circuit. When he reaches the end
of the circuit, he sends the required part of the list of Pauli corrections to Alice.
4. Alice applies Pauli corrections on the data qubits and the phase qubit (the correction on the phase qubit may be omitted
depending on applications). The output state is in the form of (1).
Theorem 2(ii). On the other hand, the two input states (cosα|00〉+ sinα|11〉)|0〉 and (sinα|00〉+ cosα|11〉)|0〉 which
are not always orthogonal to each other (α is real), cannot be distinguished by Bob at all, according to Theorem 2(i).
The considerations about data privacy leads to the following restrictions on the type of allowed circuits at the logic
level.
Theorem 3. In Scheme 2, if n > 1, the type of allowed circuits (at the logic level) does not include all circuits on n
qubits.
Proof. First, we prove for the case of even n. Consider the logical rebit defined by encoding |0〉 and |1〉 into |0〉⊗n
and |1〉⊗n, respectively. In the following we show that the logical Hadamard gate on such logical rebit cannot be
implemented. Let the two input states in Scheme 2 be |0〉⊗n|0〉 and |1〉⊗n|0〉 (where the last qubit is the phase
qubit), respectively, then after the logic Hadamard gate, the states on the data qubits become 1√
2
(|0〉⊗n + |1〉⊗n)
and 1√
2
(|0〉⊗n − |1〉⊗n), respectively (up to unimportant global phases, which may appear as a change of state on the
phase qubit). These two states are at least partially distinguishable by Bob with a constant depth circuit, according
to explicit calculations in the case n = 2 (note that these two input states are related to each other by a Z gate on
only one qubit; the calculation is by finding an off-diagonal element in Bob’s reduced density matrix that depends on
the choice of input state), which is easily generalizable to any even n. This implies that the two original input states
are at least partially distinguishable by Bob, which violates Theorem 2(i). Therefore, the logic Hadamard gate on
such logical rebit cannot be implemented deterministically.
Next, we prove for the case of odd n where n ≥ 3. The input states |0〉⊗n|0〉 and |0〉⊗(n−1)|1〉|0〉 can be at least
partially distinguished, according to explicit calculations. (Note that these two input states are related to each other
9Scheme 2 QHE for a large class of circuits with real input and partial data privacy
The type of allowed circuits: the logical circuit contains one or more real Y -diagonal unitaries which act on all n data
qubits, interspersed with Rz(
jπ
2
) (j = 1, 3) on all of the data qubits. In the physical circuit, there are multiple uses of the gate
gadget on each data qubit, interspersed with two-qubit controlled-Ry(jπ) gates between a data qubit (at arbitrary position)
and the phase qubit.
The type of allowed input states: real input states, or complex input states encoded in the rebit form of (1).
1. Alice and Bob initially share some EPR pairs. Alice prepares the classical input state in the data qubits. Alice has an
ancillary qubit to be used the phase qubit. The desired circuit is decomposed using real Y -diagonal unitaries and the
logical Rz(
jπ
2
) (j = 1, 3) gates. It is assumed that both parties know the general form and the fixed one-qubit gates in
the desired circuit, except that the details of the Y -diagonal unitaries are known only to Bob.
2. Alice implements the fixed gates and her part of the gate gadgets. The logical Rz(
jπ
2
) (j = 1, 3) gates are implemented
using the controlled-Ry(jπ) gate on the real data qubit and her phase qubit. For a real Y -diagonal unitary acting on
all data qubits, it is implemented with the help of some gate gadgets (each on one data qubit) similar to the one in
Fig. 1 but with Bob’s operations modified. Each gadget initially contains an EPR pair of qubits: a on Alice’s side, and
b on Bob’s side. Alice performs a local controlled-iσy gate with the qubit a as the control, and the real data qubit as
the target. She then does a Ry(
π
2
) gate followed by a Z-basis measurement on the qubit a. She sends Bob all available
measurement outcomes.
3. Bob receives Alice’s message. He maintains a list of Pauli corrections for the data qubits and Alice’s phase qubit, and
initially they are all I. For each Y -diagonal unitary which may act on multiple qubits, he does the following: for each
gadget, if Alice’s measurement outcome in this gadget corresponds to |0〉, he does a P gate on his qubit in the gadget;
otherwise he does a P† gate on this qubit. When there are Z or X in his list of Pauli corrections, he also does Z gates
on the relevant qubits in the gadgets. He then performs a unitary transform C given in Eq. (5) which acts jointly on all
his qubits in the relevant gate gadgets. He then does a measurement in the Z basis on each of the transformed qubits.
According to the measurement results, he updates his list of Pauli corrections [Ry(π) for each measurement outcome 1].
He updates the list when passing each fixed gate or later Y -diagonal unitaries in the circuit. When he reaches the end
of the circuit, he sends the required part of the list of Pauli corrections to Alice.
4. Alice applies Pauli corrections on the data qubits and the phase qubit (the correction on the phase qubit may be omitted
depending on applications). The output state is in the form of (1).
by an X gate on the last data qubit.) This implies that the unitary that maps |1〉⊗n|0〉 to |0〉⊗(n−1)|1〉|0〉 while keeping
|0〉⊗n|0〉 unchanged cannot be implemented deterministically, since otherwise the two states |0〉⊗n|0〉 and |1〉⊗n|0〉 are
at least partially distinguishable by Bob, which violates Theorem 2(i). This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
For general complex input states encoded in rebit form, there is some evidence that partial data privacy exists in
general. Specifically, there is numerical evidence that if classical information is encoded in some random (non-Pauli
and non-real) product bases, and then encoded into the rebit form, Bob cannot generally distinguish the input states
deterministically with a depth-2 circuit (depth-2 means there are two gadgets on each qubit line). Note that if the
product bases above are chosen to be real, then Bob may deterministically distinguish between some pairs of input
states with a depth-2 circuit, according to the argument in the proof of Theorem 1.
For circuit privacy in the two schemes above, we have the following theorem. (The input size is n.)
Theorem 4. If Scheme 1 (or Scheme 2) is used for implementing a unitary, Alice learns at most O(n) bits of
information about the circuit; If it is used for computing a classical function with k output bits, Alice learns at most
k bits of information about the circuit.
Proof. In [41, Theorem 1], consider the case that the initial maximum classical mutual information Ic(ρ) = 0, which
means two systems A and B satisfy that ρAB = ρA⊗ ρB. After l bits of classical communication in one direction, the
maximum classical mutual information is at most l bits. Consider adding a hypothetical program register in Scheme 1
or 2 on Bob’s side, and call it C. After Alice has sent measurement outcomes to Bob in the scheme, the combined
system of Alice’s system (denoted A) and C is in a direct product (mixed) state. Then, after some local operations
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on Bob’s side between C and Bob’s other systems, the systems A and C is still in a direct product (mixed) state.
Then l bits of classical message is sent by Bob to Alice. Applying [41, Theorem 1] to this case, we get that the final
maximum classical mutual information is at most l bits. This means Alice learns at most l bits of information about
the program register C. Thus the assertions hold. ⊓⊔
In Scheme 2, since Bob only sends 2n classical bits, Alice can learn at most 2n bits of information about the circuit.
We think this amount is optimal for a sufficiently large class of circuits such as the one in Scheme 2), since Alice could
always use superdense coding to learn about 2n bits from the output of the computation.
V. AN INTERACTIVE QHE SCHEME
Before describing the main interactive QHE scheme and its enhanced version, we first introduce the non-interactive
Scheme 3. It is almost a subroutine in the main Scheme 4, except that it is altered a little when used in the main
scheme.
(1) About Scheme 3. We propose the following Scheme 3 for computing linear polynomials with classical input.
It is for computing y = (c +
∑n
i=1 aixi) mod 2, where xi are bit values of Alice’s classical input, and ai and c are
constant bits known to Bob. The Scheme 3 uses 2nk EPR pairs in the teleportations, where k is a positive integer
that both parties agree on. The Alice’s data xi in scheme are asymptotically secure for large k, and Bob’s attempts
to learn about the data would affect the correctness of evaluation. However, Bob’s input (the ai) are not secure:
Alice could initially entangle her input qubits with some auxiliary qubits, and carry out the scheme as if she had used
the usual input states, to learn some information about Bob’s input ai, at the cost of not computing the distributed
outcome correctly (this refers to the situation when Scheme 3 is used in Scheme 4 below, in which the sending of the
last bit by Bob is omitted, thus the outcome of the altered Scheme 3 is distributed across two parties), although she
can compute the correct outcome herself. Such property is exploited below to yield a protocol with verifications such
that Alice’s cheating can be caught by Bob.
Note that it was previously thought that Bob should permute the two qubits in each pair with probability 12 after
step 3a, but such permutation is in fact redundant (in Alice’s view) because of the withholding of partial information
in the teleportations in the following step. Thus, such step has been omitted.
The data in Scheme 3 is partially secure for any fixed k. For any (i, j) pair, it can be found that the average density
operator (averaged over the possible values of sij and tij) for the two-qubit state corresponding to each input bit xij
are not orthogonal for the cases xij = 0 and xij = 1. The trace distance of the two density operators is
1
2 . If Bob
chooses a best POVM measurement (which can be chosen to be a projective measurement: to measure the first qubit
in each pair of qubits in the Z basis, and the second qubit in the pair in the X basis), he has probability 34 of guessing
the value of xij correctly, and he has only probability
1
2 of assuredly finding out the value of xij . And because of the
effective independence among the xij with different j (given that xi is a priori unknown to Bob), Bob’s has probability
1
2k of assuredly finding out xi. Equivalently, the trace distance of the two density operators corresponding to xi = 0
or xi = 1 on the 2k qubits is
1
2k
, which agrees with the result of numerical calculations. Thus, the probability of Bob
correctly guessing xi is 1− (1− 12k )/2 = 12 + 12k , which implies that he gets little information about xi when k is large.
Since measurements generally perturb the original state, it can be expected that the correctness of the computation
cannot be guaranteed when these measurements are done, and in fact, in the current case, the requirement of exact
correctness of the computation implies that Bob cannot get any information about the value of xij , and thus he cannot
find out the xi. If approximate correctness is required, Bob still cannot get much information about the value of xi.
Since the bits of the input, the xi, are independently encrypted (as opposed to the correlated encoding in Sec. VI),
the data security automatically satisfies the IND-CPA criterion (with classical input but quantum measurements,
same below), thus the main Scheme 4 below, which contains the modified Scheme 3 as a subprocedure, satisfies the
q-IND-CPA criterion in [7]. At the end of Sec. VI below, we will mention a continuous class of variants of the current
scheme, in which the data privacy is somewhat compromised (but still good for sufficiently random input), while the
circuit privacy improves significantly.
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Scheme 3 Partially-secure QHE for computing classical linear polynomials
The type of allowed circuits: those calculating a linear polynomial y = (c+
∑n
i=1
aixi) mod 2, where xi are bit values of
Alice’s classical input, and ai and c are constant bits known to Bob.
1. Alice and Bob agree on a positive integer k related to the security of the scheme. A suitable choice of k for a single use
of the current scheme is O(log 1
ǫ
), where ǫ is a small real number indicating the targeted amount of leakage of each qubit
of data.
2. (a) For each i, Alice randomly chooses k bits xij satisfying that xi =
∑k
j=1 xij mod 2, and she generates random bits
sij , where j = 1, . . . , k. The random bits sij are unbiased and independent from each other and from the bits xij .
(b) For each (i, j) pair, Alice encodes xij ’s value 0 into |00〉 (when sij = 0) or |++〉 (when sij = 1), and xij ’s value 1
into |10〉 (when sij = 0) or |+−〉 (when sij = 1).
(c) For each pair of qubits, she teleports them to Bob without telling him the bit for Z correction on the first qubit
nor the bit for X correction on the second qubit. When sij = 0, she records the bit for X correction on the second
qubit as tij , otherwise she records the bit for Z correction on the first qubit as tij . Then tij is a random bit.
3. (a) For each (i, j) pair, if ai = 0, Bob does a CNOT gate on the two received qubits corresponding to xij , otherwise he
does nothing.
(b) Bob teleports the resulting qubits to Alice, but withholding part of the information about the measurement out-
comes: he calculates the XOR of the two measurement outcomes in the teleportation of each qubit, and calculate
the XOR of the obtained two bits in each pair, and sends the resulting bit to Alice. Thus, Alice receives the two
qubits with a possible σy mask for each qubit, together with possible σz masks on an even number of qubits in each
pair of qubits. If the σy correction is needed for one received qubit, we regard Bob’s mask bit for that qubit as 1,
and otherwise we regard it as 0.
4. For each (i, j) pair, Alice measures the two qubits in the Z basis if sij = 0, and in the X basis if sij = 1. She calculates
the XOR of both outcomes, and take the XOR with tij , and obtains a bit. She flips this bit if sij and Bob’s sent bit for
this pair are both 1. Alice calculates the XOR of the obtained bits for all different (i, j). Bob calculates the XOR value
of c and all his mask bits for the 2kn qubits, and sends the resulting bit to Alice. Alice corrects the output by a bit flip
if the last sent bit from Bob is 1, and the result is the final output.
For circuit privacy, we first discuss the case of Alice being honest, i.e. she exactly follows the protocol: in this case,
Bob’s sending of functions of measurement outcomes in the teleportations do not reveal useful information. Thus
Alice learns at most 1 bit of information about the circuit, for the same reason as shown in the proof of Theorem 4.
In the following we discuss circuit privacy in the case of a cheating Alice. She could use some input state different
from that specified in the scheme, or initially entangle her input qubits with some auxiliary qubits, and carry out the
scheme as if she had used the usual input states, to learn some information about Bob’s input ai. Her best choice
in the case of n = 1 is to use the two qubit state 12 (|00〉 + |01〉 + |10〉 − |11〉) for a particular (i, j) pair. After Bob
returns two qubits, she can find out Bob’s input ai with certainty. But if Alice cheats, she generally cannot get a
definite distributed outcome aixij (which is expected to exist as the XOR of two bits at the two parties) related to
the particular xij . Although she may learn ai by cheating and compute aixij by herself, such computation result is
on Alice’s side only, while in the form of Scheme 3 used in Scheme 4 below, it is distributed as the XOR of two bits at
opposite parties. If Bob asks Alice to send back her part of the (classical) result to combine with his corresponding
mask bit (which is itself the XOR of two local bits), an error would sometimes occur. The technical reason that
for those j for which Alice cheated, she cannot definitely make the distributed outcome correct is because of the
following: in the case of a conclusive measurement outcome of her POVM to distinguish Bob’s two programs, she
cannot deterministically and correctly find out Bob’s values of the logical mask bit (the XOR of his two local mask
bits) since that needs a measurement incompatible with that POVM she performed. (The previous statement is
a somewhat nontrivial fact implied by that the two cases of zero or two σz masks for the pair may appear with
probability 12 each.) Thus Alice would have significant probability of error in learning the logical mask bit of Bob’s.
Next, we discuss two different strategies of Alice’s.
One strategy a cheating Alice may adopt is to aim for perfect knowledge about ai. This can be achieved by using
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the type of input state mentioned in the last paragraph (or some other states), but then she would have significant
probability of error in guessing the mask bit of Bob’s. Since such mask bits are used in Scheme 4 below for the T
gates, Alice’s lack of knowledge about such bits would cause the evaluation to be incorrect, unless she chooses to
deviate from the scheme once she has cheated by learning perfectly about some ai: she calculates the intermediate
result directly from the knowledge about ai, and cheats later to learn about Bob’s other coefficient(s), and calculates
the new intermediate result, and continues to do this throughout the evaluation. Therefore, we may say that Alice’s
cheating may either affect the correctness of the evaluation, or cause deviation from the original protocol, and in both
cases such cheating would be caught by Bob in an interactive scheme (Scheme 5 below).
Another strategy for Alice is that she aims for partial knowledge about ai and partial knowledge of Bob’s mask
bit. She could use joint input states and joint measurements across different j to increase her probability of success
in learning both Bob’s input and the overall mask bit of Bob’s, which has been confirmed by numerical calculations.
As a result of this type of attack, we estimate that Alice would have significant probability of guessing correctly both
the output bit and Bob’s overall logical mask bit for a particular variable xi. Since a variable will appear for many
times in the Scheme 4 below, with suitable choices of the k (see below), the probability of Alice guessing correctly
both the contribution to the output from the variable xi, and the overall mask bit of Bob’s related to that variable,
can be upper bounded by a constant.
(2) About Scheme 4. The following Scheme 4 is an interactive scheme. It has asymptotic data privacy but the
circuit privacy is not good. Later in Scheme 5 we add some artificial verifications for improving circuit privacy.
In Scheme 4, we denote an upper bound on the number of T gates in the desired circuit as R. The scheme makes use
of some ideas from the computationally-secure QHE scheme TP in [8]: the idea of teleporting the state to Bob’s side to
let him do the gates; and the garden-hose construction for doing a Clifford gate depending on the exclusive-OR of two
bits at opposite parties (Appendix B). It also uses many instances of Scheme 3 (called the lower-level scheme here),
except the very last small step in it, namely the correction of the output bit by Alice according to Bob’s message. This
is because in Scheme 4 we hope to reduce Bob’s messages to Alice as much as possible, for improving circuit privacy.
The general structure of the scheme in [8] is that Alice first teleports the input state to Bob’s side, but withholds
the Pauli keys, and Bob performs the Clifford gates and the T gates in the desired circuit, while the corrections are
calculated with the help of a classical HE scheme and some measurement on some EPR pairs (based on the “garden
hose” technique developed in some related papers). In this work we get rid of the classical HE scheme, and only use
the most elementary instance of the “garden hose” model. By combining Scheme 3 with the simple “garden hose”
model in Appendix B, we obtain an interactive QHE scheme.
In the scheme, we make use of the following polynomials to update the initial Pauli keys. The fa,i and fb,i
(i = 1, . . . , n) are key-updating polynomials which are linear polynomials in 2n+4R variables. All variables are in the
finite field F2. The first 2n variables are the initial Pauli keys a, i and b, i (i = 1, . . . , n), corresponding to the Pauli
operator
⊗n
i=1X
a,i
i Z
b,i
i applied on n qubits. The other 4R variables are Alice’s Bell-state measurement outcomes
in the “garden hose” gadget in Appendix B. The output of the polynomials are {fa,i, fb,i}ni=1, corresponding to the
Pauli correction
⊗n
i=1X
fa,i
i Z
fb,i
i . (If these 4R variables are not introduced, Alice would need to tell the Bell-state
measurement outcomes to Bob, making the data less secure for a cheating Bob.)
The initial 2n variables are unchanged at each Clifford stage in the circuit. Bob changes the coefficients for them in
the polynomials in instances of Scheme 3. The way Bob changes the coefficients is because of some key-update rules,
and we call them effective key-update rules below, since they do not change Alice’s keys but rather change Bob’s
coefficients. The effective key-update rules for the first 2n variables under the action of Clifford gates are reversible
(hence no new variables need to be introduced), and they can be easily obtained from the following relations:
PX = iXZP, PZ = ZP,
HX = ZH, HZ = XH,
CNOT12(X
a
1Z
b
1 ⊗ Xc2Zd2) = (Xa1Zb⊕d1 ⊗ Xa⊕c2 Zd2)CNOT12, (6)
where the ⊕ is addition modulo 2, and in the gate CNOT12, the qubit 1 is the control. The effective key-update rules
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for the first 2n variables under the T gate can be obtained from the relations
TZ = ZT, TX = e−πi/4PXZT. (7)
More details about the key-update rules are in [7, 8].
The Scheme 4 works for any quantum input, including states with complex amplitudes, and mixed states. There
are 2n+R instances of Scheme 3 in Scheme 4. There are R instances of the gadget in Appendix B for correcting an
unwanted P gate after a T gate, up to Pauli corrections.
Scheme 4 Partially-secure interactive QHE for general quantum input
1. Alice and Bob initially share some EPR pairs. Alice performs the local operations in teleporting the n encrypted data
qubits to Bob without sending any message to Bob. This means Bob instantly receives n data qubits with unknown
Pauli masks. She keeps a classical copy of the Pauli keys corresponding to the measurement results in teleportations.
The two parties agree on a positive integer k which is related to the security of the scheme.
2. For each of the R Clifford stages before a T gate in the target circuit, the two parties do the following.
(a) According to the desired circuit, Bob performs local Clifford gates on the “received” n data qubits. For the T gate
in the desired circuit, Bob does the T gate.
(b) The two parties do an instance of Scheme 3 (with the sending of the last bit by Bob and the last bit flip by Alice
in Scheme 3 omitted, and called “the lower-level scheme” below). This requires Bob to wait for Alice’s message
before he does quantum operations, but while waiting, he could do some local classical calculations for finding
the coefficients in the polynomials (including the constant term c in the polynomial) to be used in the instance
of Scheme 3. The coefficients are calculated based on Bob’s previous measurement outcomes, his outcomes in
previous instances of the lower-level scheme, and his knowledge about the desired circuit. Alice performs her first
part of operations in this instance of the lower-level scheme (up to sending messages to Bob), with the 2n variables
being the initial Pauli keys, and 4R variables being her Bell-state measurement outcomes (the outcomes for those
measurements not yet carried out are regarded as zero). After receiving Alice’s message, Bob performs his part
of operations in the lower-level scheme, and this includes sending some messages to Alice which are functions of
measurement outcomes in the teleportations. After receiving Bob’s message, Alice does the remaining operations
in the lower-level scheme. Each party obtains a bit as their outcome for the instance of the lower-level scheme.
(c) The XOR value of the two bits obtained above indicates whether a P† correction needs to be performed. The
two parties perform the Bell-state measurements in the garden-hose gadget in Appendix B locally, without any
communication. (Since Alice’s Bell-state measurements, not including the P† gates, are independent of her input
bit, there are only 4 bits for the outcomes of Alice’s Bell-state measurements in each use of the gadget.)
3. Bob does the final stage of Clifford gates in the desired circuit on the encoded data qubits. He does local operations in
teleporting the n encoded data qubits to Alice, but without sending her the measurement outcomes in the teleportation.
4. Alice and Bob perform the following procedure 2n times in parallel, each for calculating a Pauli key on one of the n
output qubits in the higher-level scheme. The procedure is as follows: Bob does classical calculations to find a polynomial.
The coefficients of the polynomial are determined from Bob’s previous measurement outcomes, his outcomes in previous
instances of the lower-level scheme from step 2 above, and his knowledge about the desired circuit. Alice performs the
first part of operations in an instance of the lower-level scheme (up to sending messages to Bob) with the input data being
her 2n initial encryption keys and 4R bits which are outcomes of her previous Bell-state measurements. After receiving
Alice’s message, Bob performs the gates and measurements in the instance of the lower-level scheme. Bob corrects his
part of the correction key (one bit) using some measurement outcome in teleportation in the previous step 3, and sends
the resulting bit to Alice. Alice completes the last part of the lower-level scheme and uses the bit from Bob’s message to
correct the outcome, and regards the result as a Pauli correction key in the higher-level scheme.
5. Alice applies Pauli gates on the data qubits according to the keys from the last step, to get the output state.
The correctness of Scheme 4 follows from the correctness of Scheme 3 and our way of using the scheme TP in [8].
Since each input variable appears for O(n+R) times (for example, in each of the R polynomials related to T gates),
it is necessary to set the parameter k to be sufficiently large, while the circuit size needs to be multiplied by a factor
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to allow recompilation of the original circuit into a form not easily guessed by Alice from partial information about
the coefficients in the polynomials. In the following, we give some estimate under the requirement of asymptotic data
privacy; the circuit privacy is to be improved in Scheme 5. As mentioned previously, it is necessary to set k = O(log 1ǫ )
to hide the data in one instance of Scheme 3. Since each input variable of Alice’s appear for at most O(n+R) times in
Scheme 4, to let the data privacy be independent of the correctness of evaluation, it suffices to set k = O[log(n+Rǫ )],
where ǫ is a small positive real number describing the leak of information about an input qubit of Alice’s. An ǫ
near zero means that the qubit is almost secure. The total classical communication cost and entanglement cost are
O[(n2 + nR) log(n+Rǫ )] (bits and ebits, respectively), as there are O(n+R) instances of the lower-level scheme, each
of which uses O(nk) = O[n log(n+Rǫ )] EPR pairs and a proportional amount of classical communication.
We now discuss the circuit privacy in Scheme 4. If Alice honestly follows the protocol, the bits sent by Bob during
the instances of the lower-level scheme do not actually carry useful information about his circuit, thus she learns at
most O(n) bits about the circuit, according to the analysis after Scheme 3. This degree of circuit privacy is already
optimal for general unitary circuits, since Alice could always use dense coding to learn about 2n bits from the output
of the computation; and since we do not allow the use of initial entangled states for an honest Alice, she in fact learns
only n bits. If Alice cheats by using some other input state for each instance of the lower-level scheme, she could
learn more information about the circuit, see the discussion after Scheme 3. A method for improving circuit privacy
is in the following Scheme 5.
Scheme 5 Interactive QHE with embedded verifications for improving circuit privacy
1. It is assumed that Alice and Bob agree on an instance of Scheme 4, that is, each party knows what he or she should
know about the instance of the scheme.
2. Bob revises the original circuit by adding a constant number of auxiliary qubits initially in Pauli eigenstates on his side,
and let these qubits undergo some joint gates with the data qubits, where the gates are chosen randomly and include
some T gates, satisfying that each added qubit becomes a Pauli eigenstate independent of Alice’s input data at some
stage in the circuit. The circuit in the added part of the protocol is implemented in the same way as in Scheme 4.
In the redesigned protocol, Alice sends Bob some number of bits, each of which is her part of the distributed outcome
of an added instance of reduced Scheme 3 (“reduced” means without Bob sending her the last bit and without her
subsequent correction), and they represent Pauli masks (due to the combined effect of some Bell-state measurements in
some instances of the garden-hose gadget in Appendix B) for some auxiliary qubits at various steps in the protocol, for
him to check if Alice has cheated.
3. Alice and Bob perform the designed modified protocol. At intermediate steps, Bob measures some local auxiliary qubits,
and combines the outcomes with the Pauli masks sent by Alice, and then checks the result against his mask bits (which
are from Scheme 3) using the XOR operation, to check if their correlations (XOR of the corresponding bits) are as Bob
expected. If not, then he regards Alice as having cheated, and aborts the protocol.
4. If the protocol is completed without Bob aborting, then the final result on Alice’s side is the desired computational result.
(3) About Scheme 5. The Scheme 5 is based on Scheme 4. The general idea is that Bob asks Alice to return some
messages as outputs for his embedded checking procedures, and Bob aborts the protocol if the returned messages are
not as expected. In this way, Bob verifies the quantum computation for the original circuit. This is inspired by the
results in the literature that a quantum verifier can verify the result of a polynomial-sized quantum computation of a
prover. Some protocols of verification for different types of blind quantum computing have been constructed [25–27].
The verification protocol [28] is not intended for blind quantum computing. A computationally-secure QFHE scheme
with verification is given in [23].
The reason that verifications are of significant help here is because of a property of Scheme 4: Alice’s knowledge
about (the current part of) Bob’s program does not mean she can send back the correct messages. This is because Bob
verifies Alice’s messages against his mask bits, which are unknown to the honest Alice, and a cheating Alice cannot
(almost) deterministically find out those mask bits while (almost) deterministically learning about the related part of
Bob’s program at the same time, since the two tasks involve incompatible measurements. An error of Alice, which can
also be stated as an error of the distributed result in an instance of Scheme 3, will affect the correctness of removing
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unwanted P after each T gate. Consequently, due to the T gates added in the random gates in Scheme 5, Alice has
large probability of returning some wrong classical message, resulting in wrong state of Bob’s auxiliary qubits after
he corrects such qubits according to Alice’s message.
Here is an explanation for the “added instance of reduced Scheme 3” in Scheme 5. Such instance is for computing
a polynomial whose output is a bit, representing whether some Pauli Z or X correction should be performed on some
qubit on Bob’s side, and Bob will later measure those qubits in some suitable Pauli basis to find out whether Alice
has cheated. The input variables for such polynomial should be the (at most) 2n+4R variables in Scheme 4, but since
the verification is supposed to be independent of the input data, the 2n variables actually have zero coefficients (for
honest Bob), and the remaining (at most) 4R variables are from Alice’s Bell-state measurements in some instances of
the garden-hose gadget in Appendix B.
By choosing the level of data privacy in the original scheme suitably, the Scheme 5 keeps the original data qubits
quite secure with the exception that the verification messages may reveal information about the data. Since the total
length of such messages is limited to a constant (see the expression of m below), the amount of information leak
introduced by the revision compared to Scheme 4 is a constant. Thus, the data privacy may be quite satisfactory,
especially in the applications in which partial information about the data do not reveal much useful information,
say when the input is already the output of some hashing procedure (or the encryption procedure in some classical
homomorphic encryption scheme) acting on some original data. By choosing a suitable number of check bits from
Alice, the circuit privacy in Scheme 5 can be enhanced to a satisfactory level: suppose there are m check bits, then
since a cheating Alice would return a wrong bit with some constant probability (a cheating Alice should cheat at almost
all places in the protocol, otherwise she learns little about the circuit due to the possible different decompositions
of the circuit; see also the analysis about circuit privacy after Scheme 3), the probability that at least one check bit
is wrong is about 1 − cm, where c ∈ (0, 1) is a constant real number. If the desired level of the probability that a
cheating Alice is not caught is δ, we may set m = O(log 1δ ). Consequently, the Scheme 5 keeps all but O(log
1
δ ) qubits
of the input secure, and there is 1 − c′δ chance that the information about Bob’s intended circuit is asymptotically
secure except for an amount proportional to input size, where c′ is a constant related to the prior probability that
Alice may cheat.
Random recompilation of the circuit may help circuit privacy. For some simple types of circuits, such as Clifford
circuits, it may be helpful to recompile the circuit to fit it into a more complex class of circuits. Enlarging the circuit
size by a constant factor is already sufficient to allow for many different forms of the original circuit.
Note that a purely classical client may be used in the verification of quantum computation [23, 24] (at least in the
case of classical input and output), but this is based on computational assumptions, thus it is out of the situations
considered in Scheme 5. We leave as an open problem whether the method in [24] or [23] together with Scheme 4 can
be used to construct an interactive QHE scheme with classical client with better security than that in [10].
VI. A CLASS OF VARIANTS OF SCHEME 3
In this section, we first introduce Scheme 6, which is a variant of Scheme 3. The use of such scheme is discussed in
later sections. We then mention that there is a continuous class of variants of Scheme 3, which interpolates between
Scheme 3 and Scheme 6.
Since Scheme 6 is non-interactive, from the proof of Theorem 4, we find that a cheating Alice learns at most k + 1
bits of information about Bob’s circuit (i.e. about aj and the constant c). If the last bit of communication is omitted,
which may be the case when Scheme 6 is used in some higher-level schemes such as Scheme 4, Alice learns at most k
bits of information about Bob’s coefficients aj , and in such case the result is distributed as the XOR of two remote bits.
It should be stressed that Alice’s learning of the circuit would affect the correctness of evaluation of the distributed
result, for similar reasons as discussed after Scheme 3. If the result is not distributed, but completely on Alice’s side,
and if k+1 < n, she still cannot learn all information about Bob’s input. If Alice wants to ensure that the evaluation
(with distributed result when k + 1 ≥ n) is exactly correct, she cannot learn any information about the circuit apart
from what is learnable from the output of the evaluation. But she can learn about Bob’s input up to the amount
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Scheme 6 A variant of Scheme 3 for computing classical linear polynomials
The type of allowed circuits: those calculating a linear polynomial y = (c+
∑n
i=1
aixi) mod 2, where xi are bit values of
Alice’s classical input, and ai and c are constant bits known to Bob.
1. Alice and Bob agree on a positive integer k related to the security of the scheme. The suitable choice of k is O(n) in
general, but may be chosen to be O(log n) if correlations among input bits may be leaked (c.f. Theorem 5).
2. (a) For each i, Alice randomly chooses k bits xij satisfying that xi =
∑k
j=1
xij mod 2. She generates independent and
unbiased random bits sj , where j = 1, . . . , k. The sj are independent from xij .
(b) For each (i, j) pair, Alice encodes xij ’s value 0 into |00〉 (when sj = 0) or |++〉 (when sj = 1), and xij ’s value 1
into |10〉 (when sj = 0) or |+−〉 (when sj = 1).
(c) For each pair of qubits, she teleports them to Bob without telling him the bit for Z correction on the first qubit
nor the bit for X correction on the second qubit. When sj = 0, she records the bit for X correction on the second
qubit as tij , otherwise she records the bit for Z correction on the first qubit as tij . Then tij is a random bit.
3. (a) For each (i, j) pair, if ai = 0, Bob does a CNOT gate on the two received qubits corresponding to xij , otherwise he
does nothing.
(b) Bob teleports the resulting qubits to Alice, but withholding part of the information about the measurement out-
comes: he calculates the XOR of the two measurement outcomes in the teleportation of each qubit, and calculate
the XOR of the obtained 2n bits with the same j, and sends the resulting bit, denoted vj , to Alice. Thus, Alice
receives the qubits with a possible σy mask for each qubit, together with possible σz masks on an even number of
qubits in each group of 2n qubits. If the σy correction is needed for one received qubit, we regard Bob’s mask bit
for that qubit as 1, and otherwise we regard it as 0.
4. For each j, Alice measures the 2n qubits in the Z basis if sj = 0, and in the X basis if sj = 1. She calculates the XOR
of the 2n outcomes for the same j, and take the XOR with (
∑n
i=1
tij) mod 2, and obtains a single bit for each j. She
flips the resulting bit if sj = 1 and Bob’s sent bit vj = 1. Alice calculates the XOR of the obtained bits for all different
j. Bob calculates the XOR value of c and all his mask bits for the 2kn qubits, and sends the resulting bit to Alice. Alice
corrects the output by a bit flip if the last sent bit from Bob is 1, and the result is the final output.
mentioned above if she does not care about the correctness of evaluation of the distributed result.
For the data privacy of Scheme 6, we consider two criteria: first, when the input is a priori uniformly random
in the other party’s view, the amount of information learnable by Bob is small. The second is the usual IND-CPA
type of criterion: that any two classical input strings are hardly distinguishable by Bob. The security under the first
criterion is partially discussed in Theorem 5 and in Appendix C. It is found that even with uniformly random data,
the security of Scheme 6 is not very good by itself, but with the help of the type of verifications in the last section, the
security in an interactive QHE scheme would be quite interesting. Later we show that the data security of Scheme 6
does not satisfy the second criterion.
Theorem 5. The following statements hold for Scheme 6 in the case that Alice’s input data is uniformly distributed
in Bob’s view.
(i) The information learnable by a cheating Bob about each bit of Alice’s input is 1
2k
bits (although he may learn more
about the correlations between the input bits).
(ii) The information learnable by a cheating Bob about the joint distribution of the input bits is at least n− k bits.
Proof. (i) It is shown in the discussion after Scheme 3 that the trace distance of Bob’s two reduced density matrices
(on 2k qubits corresponding to xi) for the different values of a particular xi is exactly
1
2k . Bob actually has a very
good measurement to find out about xi in Scheme 6 (also for Scheme 3). He just needs to measure the first qubit in
each pair of qubits in the Z basis, and the second qubit in the pair in the X basis. Such measurement basis in the
combined Hilbert space of 2k qubits is a fixed basis, in which the density matrix is diagonal. The mutual information
between Alice and Bob (for uniformly random input xi) by measuring the 2k qubits in this way is exactly
1
2k
bits: it
is because the only cases in which the xi can be determined are that the qubit pairs are all in the state |0+〉 or all
in the state |1−〉, and in all other cases (which are perfectly distinguishable from the two cases just mentioned) the
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two possible bit values of xi are equally likely. An alternative way to calculate the amount of mutual information
is by using the fact that the Holevo quantity is equal to the classical mutual information in the current case, see
Appendix C.
Since the input distribution is uniformly random, each xi is 1 with probability exactly
1
2 , then, if Bob had no
prior knowledge about the {sj}, the 2kn qubits received by Bob are in a maximally mixed state in his view, for each
possible combination of the values of sj . In other words, Bob’s information about the {sj} cannot be increased at all
if he had zero information to start with. And he indeed initially has zero information about the {sj}. Hence, Bob is
completely ignorant of the {sj} even after his measurements. Therefore, his best strategy to learn about one of the
bits xi is to learn it by measuring the corresponding 2k qubits. As mentioned above, the information about the bit
xi learnable by Bob is
1
2k
bits for uniformly random input. By doing the same measurement for all input bits, and
looking at the correlations among measurement outcomes across different i, he may learn about the joint distribution
of the input bits.
(ii) If Alice further sends k bits of information about the {sj} to Bob, he would know all information about the input
{xi} by the following fixed-basis measurement below. He just needs to measure the first qubit in each pair of qubits
in the Z basis, and the second qubit in the pair in the X basis. The fixed-basis measurement and the construction of
the scheme imply that the state received by Bob is effectively classical, and since locking does not happen for classical
states [41], we get that Bob’s information about the {xi} before being told anything about the {sj} is at least n− k
bits. ⊓⊔
For more details about the classical mutual information when Alice’s input is uniformly random, see Appendix C.
As a step towards studying the security under the second criterion, we prove the following result.
Theorem 6. In Scheme 6, the trace distance between Bob’s reduced density matrices for two different input binary
strings of length n is a constant dependent only on n and k.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let the first input binary string be the all-zero string. Now assume the second input
binary string contains only one 1, then without loss of generality it can be assumed to be 0 . . . 001. Let the trace
distance between Bob’s reduced density matrices for these two input strings be c0, which depends on n and k. Now
we consider the case that the second input string contains two 1’s, and without loss of generality the string can be
assumed to be 0 . . . 011. The trace distance between Bob’s reduced density matrices for the all-zero string and the
above string can be expressed as 12 Tr
√
(ρ− σ)2. For any unitary U acting on such reduced density matrices, the
expression above is equal to 12 Tr
√
(UρU † − UσU †)2. Now let U be the following operation: Bob does k CNOT gates
with the controlling qubit being the first qubit in each of the k pairs of qubits corresponding to the input bit xn, and
the target qubit being the first qubit in each of the k pairs of qubits corresponding to the input bit xn−1; Bob also
does k CNOT gates with the controlling qubit being the second qubit in each of the k pairs of qubits corresponding
to the input bit xn−1, and the target qubit being the second qubit in each of the k pairs of qubits corresponding
to the input bit xn. The U effectively changes the input 0 . . . 001 to 0 . . . 011, while leaving the all-zero input string
unchanged. Thus, the trace distance between Bob’s reduced density matrices for the all-zero string and the 0 . . . 011
is equal to c0. By doing similar unitaries for other pairs of states corresponding to the all-zero input string and some
nonzero input string, we get that the trace distance between Bob’s reduced density matrices for the all-zero string and
any nonzero string is equal to c0. Then, noting that Ry(π) on a pair of qubits corresponding to one of the input bits xi
effectively flip the input bit xi, we have that the trace distance between Bob’s reduced density matrices corresponding
to any pair of different input binary strings is c0. This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Numerical calculations suggest that the trace distance between Bob’s reduced density matrices for the all-zero input
string and for a mixture of other input strings is also equal to the same constant in Theorem 6.
Now we discuss whether Scheme 6 is secure under the IND-CPA criterion. While it is expected that the all-zero
and the all-one inputs are more distinguishable compared to the case of only one bit input (0 or 1), which has been
confirmed by numerical calculations, it may seem counter-intuitive that many identical bits in the case of the zero
string versus 0 . . . 001 still help distinguishability compared to the one-bit input case. But there is an easy explanation
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for this phenomenon: since Bob knows the value of the input bit xi for a particular i, he may do some measurements in
the 2k qubits corresponding to xi so that he learns something about Alice’s choices of the encoding bases, i.e. the sj ,
and such partial information helps the distinguishability when he measures other qubits. A very good measurement
strategy for Bob is to measure the first qubit in each pair of qubits in the Z basis, and the second qubit in the pair
in the X basis. In this way, since he knows the value of xi for any i > 1, he may exclude about a half of the possible
strings (sj) by measuring the qubits for a particular i. After he repeats this procedure for many different i, he gets a
lot of information about (sj) such that he can measure the qubits corresponding to x1, and get quite a good amount
of information about x1, which determines the input is the zero string or the 0 . . . 001. Since his ignorance about (sj)
decreases exponentially with n, we may expect that he can distinguish the zero string or the 0 . . . 001 with probability
near 1, when n is large. And according to Theorem 6, this means the trace distance between any two different inputs
is nearly 1 for large n, implying that the Scheme 6 is not secure under the IND-CPA criterion. As a result, the overall
interactive QHE scheme based on Scheme 6 is not secure under the q-IND-CPA criterion in [7].
By using Scheme 4 as the main scheme, we obtain an interactive QHE scheme. The security depends on the
parameter range: k < n is guarantees circuit privacy, by using many T gates in the circuit and allowing recompilation
of the circuit, but the data privacy is not good; k ≫ n is good for data privacy in the case of uniformly random data,
but the circuit privacy is not good by itself, but similar to the last section, we may still in principle use Scheme 5
for improving circuit privacy by embedded verifications, at some minor cost of affecting data privacy. Some further
discussions about the uses of Scheme 6 in bipartite secure computation and interactive QHE are in Sec. VIII.
A last comment is that the schemes in Sec. V may be improved by partially using the method in this section: in
Scheme 3, all the sij are independently random. If we change the choices such that about m bits sij are the same,
for the same j but different i, then we may reduce the amount of classical communication from Bob to Alice by a
factor of about m. This should help circuit privacy when Scheme 3 is used as a subprocedure in Scheme 4 and later
in Scheme 5, while the data privacy is somewhat compromised, but if m is small enough, say m = o(log2 k), then the
data security is still of the IND-CPA type, according to the remarks after Theorem 6 above.
VII. A SCHEME FOR COMPUTING CLASSICAL LINEAR POLYNOMIALS BASED ON
INFORMATION LOCKING
In this section, we introduce Scheme 7, which is a variant of Scheme 6 and Scheme 3. It makes use of the method
of information locking by quantum techniques [41]. An application of Scheme 7 is discussed in the next section.
Similar to the last section, from the proof of Theorem 4, a cheating Alice learns at most k + 2 bits of information
about Bob’s circuit (i.e. about aj and the constant c). If the last bit of communication is omitted, which may be
the case when Scheme 7 is used in some higher-level schemes such as Scheme 4, Alice learns at most k + 1 bits of
information about Bob’s coefficients aj , and in such case the result is distributed as the XOR of two remote bits.
It should be stressed that Alice’s learning of the circuit would affect the correctness of evaluation of the distributed
result, for similar reasons as discussed after Scheme 3. If the result is not distributed, but completely on Alice’s side,
and if k+2 < n, she still cannot learn all information about Bob’s input. If Alice wants to ensure that the evaluation
(with distributed result when k + 2 ≥ n) is exactly correct, she cannot learn any information about the circuit apart
from what is learnable from the output of the evaluation. But she can learn about Bob’s input up to the amount
mentioned above if she does not care about the correctness of evaluation of the distributed result.
For the data privacy of Scheme 7, we consider two criteria: first, when the input is a priori uniformly random
in the other party’s view, the amount of information learnable by Bob is small. The second is the usual IND-CPA
type of criterion: that any two classical input strings are hardly distinguishable by Bob. The security under the first
criterion is partially discussed in Theorem 7 and in Appendix C. It is better than Scheme 6, but the precise level of
security for large k still needs further study. Later we show that the data security of Scheme 7 does not satisfy the
second criterion, at least when k ≤ n.
Theorem 7. The following statements hold for Scheme 7 in the case that Alice’s input data is uniformly distributed
in Bob’s view.
19
Scheme 7 A scheme for computing classical linear polynomials using quantum data locking
The type of allowed circuits: those calculating a linear polynomial y = (c+
∑n
i=1
aixi) mod 2, where xi are bit values of
Alice’s classical input, and ai and c are constant bits known to Bob.
1. Alice and Bob agree on a positive integer k related to the security of the scheme. The suitable choice of k is O(n) in
general, but may be chosen to be O(log n) if correlations among input bits may be leaked.
2. (a) For each i, Alice randomly chooses k bits xij satisfying that xi =
∑k
j=1
xij mod 2. She generates independent
unbiased random bits sj and tj , where j = 1, . . . , k. The sj , tj are independent from xij .
(b) For each (i, j) pair, Alice encodes xij ’s value 0 into |0〉 (when sj = 0) or |+〉 (when sj = 1), and xij ’s value 1 into
|1〉 (when sj = 0) or |−〉 (when sj = 1).
(c) For each j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Alice encodes tj into a qubit using the rule in the previous step.
(d) Alice teleports the k(n+ 1) qubits to Bob.
3. (a) Bob denotes w :=
∑n
i=1
ai mod 2.
(b) For each j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Bob does the following: if all ai are zero, he sets uj := 0 and vj := 0. Otherwise, he arranges
the received qubits corresponding to xij satisfying ai = 1 into pairs (with one unpaired qubit when w = 1), and
does a CNOT gate on each pair, with the qubit of smaller index i as the control; if w = 1, Bob does a CNOT gate
on the unpaired qubit with the qubit corresponding to tj , with the former as the control. Bob measures the first
qubit in each pair from in the X basis, and records the XOR (sum modulo 2) of the results of all such measurements
as uj . He measures the second qubit in each pair in the Z basis, and records the XOR of the results of all such
measurements as vj . He sets Rj := uj ⊕ vj (where ⊕ means XOR).
(c) He sends the bits Rj (j = 1, . . . , k) and the bit w to Alice.
4. Alice calculates y0 :=
∑k
j=1(sjRj + tjw) mod 2. Bob calculates (c +
∑k
j=1 uj) mod 2, and sends the resulting bit to
Alice. Alice takes the XOR of y0 and the last sent bit from Bob, and the result is the final output.
(i) The information learnable by a cheating Bob about each bit of Alice’s input is Ω( 1
2k
) bits.
(ii) The information learnable by a cheating Bob about the joint distribution of the input bits is at least ⌊n2 ⌋ − k bits.
Proof. (i) It can be found by explicit calculation that if k = 1, the trace distance of Bob’s two reduced density
matrices for a particular xi is exactly
1√
2
. For larger k, since the encoded states are independent among the qubits
with different j (provided that xi is unknown to Bob), the trace distance of Bob’s two reduced density matrices for a
particular xi is exactly
1
2k/2
. Hence, by measuring each qubit in a best basis, the mutual information between Alice
and Bob (for uniformly random input xi) by measuring the k qubits is Ω(
1
2k
) bits, and numerical calculations suggest
that the mutual information and the Holevo bound (limited to one particular xi) may be Θ(
1
2k
) bits.
Since the input distribution is uniformly random, each xi is 1 with probability exactly
1
2 , then, if Bob had no prior
knowledge about the {sj}, the k(n+ 1) qubits received by Bob are in a maximally mixed state in his view, for each
possible combination of the values of sj . In other words, Bob’s information about the {sj} cannot be increased at all
if he had zero information to start with. And he indeed initially has zero information about the {sj}. Hence, Bob
is completely ignorant of the {sj} even after his measurements. Therefore, his best strategy to learn about one of
the bits xi is to learn it by measuring the corresponding k qubits. As mentioned above, the information about the
bit xi learnable by Bob is Ω(
1
2k
) bits for uniformly random input, which may be a tight bound. By doing the same
measurement for all input bits, and looking at the correlations among measurement outcomes across different i, he
may learn about the joint distribution of the input bits.
(ii) Bob may choose to do CNOT gates between pairs of qubits with the same j, and measure them in the X or Z
bases as in the scheme. If Alice further sends k bits of information about the {sj} to Bob, and one bit about
∑k
j=1 tj
mod 2, he would know all information about the input {(xi + xi+1) mod 2 : i odd and 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, which amounts
to ⌈n2 ⌉ bits. Note that Bob had done a measurement in a fixed bases, so the state he received before measurement is
effectively classical. Since locking does not happen for classical states [41], we get that Bob’s information about the
{xi} before being told anything about the {sj} and the
∑k
j=1 tj mod 2 is at least ⌈n2 ⌉ − k − 1 bits. And since when
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n is even, Bob does not need the information about the bit
∑k
j=1 tj mod 2, the information obtainable by Bob in
the scheme is actually at least ⌊n2 ⌋ − k bits. ⊓⊔
Since the quantity in Theorem 7(ii) is less than that in Theorem 5, we may regard Scheme 7 as having better data
privacy than Scheme 6. But for large k, say k = n, the amount of information learnable by Bob may be not much
smaller than that in Scheme 6; further work is needed to give a conclusive statement on this. Note that the security
in Scheme 7 is not always composable, due to the locking property that it relies on: some further small amount
of communication from Alice to Bob may reveal much information about her input. This would affect the use of
Scheme 7 in some cascaded schemes that aims to achieve interactive QHE, where the data privacy is required to be
near-perfect. An example of an “cascaded scheme” is that the local evaluation of a linear polynomial near the end of
Scheme 7 is replaced with a bipartite protocol which is an instance of Scheme 7 (or Scheme 6 or Scheme 3), and the
initiating party in both the top level and the lower level is Bob rather than Alice. A different cascaded scheme which
aims for near-perfect data privacy is described in Sec. VIII. On the other hand, for the bipartite secure computing
problems which do not require near-perfect security for either party, the Scheme 7 would find it use: the simplest
example is the computation of the bipartite classical inner-product function, which requires only one use of Scheme 7.
If we choose k = 1, Alice would leak at most n2 bits of information according to [41], and Bob would leak at most 3
bits of information. This level of security can be regarded as nontrivial because n2 + 3 < n for large n.
The data privacy of Scheme 7 does not hold under the second criterion, at least when k ≤ n, for the similar reason
as in the last section. Suppose the two input strings for Bob to distinguish are the 0 . . . 000 versus 0 . . . 001. When
k ≤ n, he can choose to measure some qubits corresponding to i < n, to learn about the {sj}, and then use such
information and some measurement on the remaining qubit(s) corresponding to i = n to learn about which input
string it is with some non-negligible probability. Thus, the Scheme 6 is not secure under the IND-CPA criterion when
k ≤ n.
Although Scheme 7 is somewhat better than Scheme 6 in security, it may be harder to implement. In Scheme 7, Bob
needs to perform CNOT gates on some pairs of qubits determined by his input. This poses problems in experimental
implementation, particularly when using photons, which hardly interact with each other. But Bob does not have to
send back quantum states to Alice. In comparison, Bob only does CNOT gates on fixed pairs of qubits in Scheme 6,
but needs to send or teleport back some quantum states to Alice.
VIII. COMBINED USE OF THE PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED SCHEMES
In this section, we first present the following Scheme 8 for evaluating classical linear polynomials that makes two
uses of Scheme 7. Such scheme can be used as a subprocedure in Scheme 4, giving rise to an interactive QHE scheme
with partial data and circuit privacy without resorting to allowing early terminations, but it only works for the
case that the data is almost uniformly distributed, and when the circuit is short (see remarks below). Note that by
modifying the last steps in the similar way as in previous schemes, the scheme has a version with distributed output
(the XOR of two distant bits).
Scheme 8 A scheme for computing classical linear polynomials by two uses of Scheme 7
The type of allowed circuits: those calculating a linear polynomial y = (c+
∑n
i=1
aixi) mod 2, where xi are bit values of
Alice’s classical input, and ai and c are constant bits known to Bob.
1. Run a partial instance of Scheme 7 up to the step of just before Bob sends Alice any message, with k = ⌈γn⌉, where the
constant γ < 2 and γ > 1 (e.g. γ = 3
2
is a valid choice).
2. Instead of the local evaluation of a classical linear polynomial
∑k
j=1
sjRj+tjw mod 2 in the instance of Scheme 6 above,
run a bipartite protocol: it is almost an instance of Scheme 7 with k′ = 1 (we use k′ here to distinguish from the k in
Step 1), with Bob as the first party and Alice as the second party, but with the last sending of the mask bit omitted.
3. Alice and Bob perform the remaining operations in the instance of Scheme 7. The distributed outcome in Step 2 is
treated by Bob sending Alice his bit in the distributed pair of bits.
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A brief security analysis of the scheme is as follows. The information about Alice’s input {xi} leaked to Bob in Step
1 is O(poly(n)2k−n ) bits, due to that k = γn with γ some constant between 1 and 2, and that the data privacy in Scheme 7
can be regarded as being similar to but slightly better than Scheme 6, and the latter is analyzed in Appendix C.
Such amount of leakage of the data is exponentially small. Alice’s sending of up to 2 bits in Step 2 may reveal some
information about the sj (and hence about the xij in the higher level scheme) in the instance of Scheme 3, but since
k = γn and that Alice’s inputs in Step 2 are the sj , no definitive information about {xi} is leaked, and when n is
large, the amount of leaked information about {xi} is quite small, even if Bob cheats. For γ = 32 , we estimate that
a cheating Bob may learn an exponentially small amount of information in total about Alice’s input. On the other
hand, Bob may leak up to half of the input size in Step 2, i.e. at most ⌈γn2 ⌉ bits. Thus, about (1 − γ2 )n bits of
information about Bob’s coefficients ai is secure from a cheating Alice.
If the use of Scheme 7 in the Steps 1 and 3 is replaced with Scheme 6, the security is harmed in the case that
Alice is dishonest: she could use some entangled states on pairs qubits (e.g. same as that mentioned in the analysis
of Scheme 3) to find out Bob’s input from the returned state from Bob, although this would make the computation
result incorrect. In contrast, if Scheme 7 is used in the top level as described above, Bob does not send back any
quantum state except in the Step 2, so this makes the input of Bob much safer. Interestingly, there is a classical
analog of Scheme 6 (which can also be regarded as a classical analog of Scheme 7), such that when it is used in the
Steps 1 and 3 in Scheme 8 in place of Scheme 7, the overall circuit privacy is about the same, while the data privacy
weakens slightly; the overall scheme becomes easier to implement since a large part becomes classical. The description
of such classical scheme is listed as Scheme 9 below. Note that by modifying the last steps in the similar way as in
previous schemes, the scheme has a version with distributed output (the XOR of two distant bits).
Scheme 9 A classical scheme for computing classical linear polynomials
The type of allowed circuits: those calculating a linear polynomial y = (c+
∑n
i=1
aixi) mod 2, where xi are bit values of
Alice’s classical input, and ai and c are constant bits known to Bob.
1. Alice and Bob agree on a positive integer k related to the security of the scheme. The suitable choice of k is O(n) in
general, but may be chosen to be O(log n) if correlations among input bits may be leaked.
2. (a) For each i, Alice randomly chooses k bits xij satisfying that xi =
∑k
j=1
xij mod 2. She generates independent
unbiased random bits sj , where j = 1, . . . , k. The sj are independent from xij .
(b) For each (i, j) pair, Alice prepares two bits. When sj = 0, the first bit in the pair is equal to xij , otherwise the
second bit in the pair is xij . The other bit in the pair is a completely random bit.
(c) Alice sends the resulting kn bits to Bob.
3. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , k},Bob records the sum modulo 2 of the first bits in those pairs corresponding to ai = 1 with the
given j as uj , and the similar quantity for the second bits in the pairs as vj . He sets Rj := uj ⊕ vj (where ⊕ means
XOR). He sends the bits Rj (j = 1, . . . , k) to Alice.
4. Alice calculates y0 :=
∑k
j=1
sjRj mod 2. Bob calculates (c +
∑k
j=1
uj) mod 2, and sends the resulting bit to Alice.
Alice takes the XOR of y0 and the last sent bit from Bob, and the result is the final output.
The analysis of the data privacy in Scheme 9 is similar to that of Scheme 6, so the data privacy is somewhat weaker
than Scheme 7 under the same parameter k. The circuit leakage is upper bounded by the amount of communication.
The use of Scheme 9 alone is not very interesting, but the combined use with Scheme 7 as mentioned above makes it
quite interesting. Another possibility is to combine it with classical homomorphic encryption schemes, which is out
of the scope of the current work.
Another potential alternative to Scheme 8 is using Scheme 7 alone with some suitable choice of k, but this method
does not enjoy the security advantage from the backward instance of Scheme 7 in Step 2 above, thus we expect that
it cannot fully reproduce the security characteristics of Scheme 8.
In the Step 2 of Scheme 8, if an instance of Scheme 7 with k′ > 1 is used, the amount of data leakage is somewhat
larger, but the circuit privacy improves a lot. A pessimistic estimate of the amount of information leakage of Bob’s
circuit is about γ2n− k
′
2 + C bits, where C is a constant (this is by borrowing from the estimate for Scheme 6, since
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it is believed that the security of Scheme 7 is not worse than Scheme 6), and since k′ should be slightly smaller than
(γ − 1)n to make the data secure (c.f. Appendix C), we estimate that the information leakage of Bob’s circuit is not
more than (12 + ǫ)n+ C bits, where ǫ is a small positive constant. In other words, (
1
2 − ǫ)n− C bits of information
about Bob’s circuit can be secure.
By using the scheme as a subprocedure in Scheme 4 (which requires slight modifications to the scheme to make
the output distributed, i.e. represented by the XOR of two distant bits), we obtain an interactive QHE scheme with
partial data and circuit privacy without resorting to allowing early terminations. The data privacy is quite good
for short circuits, since each use of the subprocedure by itself leaks an exponentially small amount of information to
Bob, while the repeated uses of the subprocedure may give rise to worse data privacy. Because of the construction of
Scheme 7, the leaked information in one subprocedure may help the cheating Bob significantly in the next instance
of the subprocedure, because the information from the previous subprocedure helps Bob learn the sj in the next
subprocedure, which in turn helps him learn some of the variables xi. Similar to other schemes mentioned previously,
Alice’s or Bob’s cheating necessarily affects the correctness of evaluation. Given the above, without further using the
verification techniques, the obtained interactive QHE scheme is only good for the case that the number of T gates is
O(n), and only for the case that the data is almost uniformly distributed. Because of the limitation to circuit size,
the circuit privacy is also not ideal: Bob may hide about O(n2) bits of information about the circuit. However, by
combining with the verification techniques (such as that in Scheme 5) in an interactive protocol, better data and
circuit privacy may be obtained.
As a way to avoid the requirement that “the data is almost uniformly distributed”, it is possible to use a different
overall structure of QHE than Scheme 4, namely, keeping data on Alice’s side. The techniques can be partially seen
in the first version of the current draft and also in some blind quantum computing schemes. We put such method
and related experiment in a separate work. Such method still has the similar limitation on the circuit depth (e.g.
limitation on the number of T gates).
A lesson learned from the above analysis is that repeated evaluation of linear polynomials with the same variables
would often affect data privacy significantly. To avoid this problem, in Sec. IX below, we consider letting Alice use
newly generated intermediate variables as much as possible in the linear polynomials. (Two other protocols based
on the similar idea are also considered.) This seems a natural fit for the problem of evaluation of classical functions,
rather than (interactive) QHE.
IX. APPLICATIONS IN SECURE EVALUATION OF CLASSICAL FUNCTIONS
In this section, we consider the problem in which Alice tries to evaluate a classical function known to Bob on her
private data, and the ideal goal is to keep the data private from Bob, and the function private from Alice, apart
from what can be learnt from the output. The actual security is worse, and there is some limitation to the circuit
size. The steps of the scheme are as follows. Note that no initial quantum-one-pad nor its classical counterpart are used.
1. Decompose the classical circuit to be evaluated into a form which consists of evaluation of classical linear
polynomials and the XOR and AND functions of some bits, where the input and output of such functions may be
intermediate variables.
2. For each classical linear polynomial, use the combined scheme for evaluating classical linear polynomials in-
troduced in the last section, but with the sending by Bob of the last bit omitted. Hence, the result is distributed
across two parties. Rewrite the later XOR and AND functions and the linear polynomials in terms of the distributed
intermediate variables.
3. For the next function in the circuit, continue to do Step 2, until the end of the circuit is reached.
Note that the AND functions above refers to the AND between two of Alice’s bits, so it is not a special case of
a linear polynomial with bipartite input. The data privacy of the scheme depends very much on how many times
the (original or intermediate) variables are reused. The more they are reused, the worse the data privacy is. If each
23
variable is reused for at most a constant number of times, then the data privacy is quite good: Bob learns a negligible
amount about the variables, unless he chooses to cheat by using trivial programs, so that the intermediate variables
carry the equivalent information about the original variables. Hence, the correctness of the scheme implies the data
privacy. Since the circuit can be polynomial in the input size n, Bob can hide O(nm) bits, were m is the number
of linear polynomials in the decomposed circuit, and it is assumed that all linear polynomials have input size O(n)
and at least a constant fraction of them are of size Θ(n). This protocol still has the problem that many intermediate
results may depend on the same set of initial variables, hence the initial variables are not very secure for long circuits.
Thus, the number of allowed linear polynomials in the circuit is restricted to O(n) and less than c ·n, where c is some
constant less than 1 determined from the security analysis of Scheme 6.
To resolve this problem, we may change the combined scheme for evaluating linear polynomials in Step 2, so that at
the top level it uses Scheme 3 rather than Scheme 6, in order to achieve better data privacy. This gives rise to worse
circuit privacy, but from the fact that Alice cannot learn perfectly about both Bob’s input and the masks, Alice’s
cheating would affect the correctness of evaluation (of the distributed result) after many gates. She can choose to
always cheat by learning Bob’s coefficients without learning Bob’s masks at each polynomial, but then the final result
would be on Alice’s side only and is not distributed, so if some bits in the final result are to be sent to Bob, he would
acquire a wrong result after taking the XOR of the sent bits from Alice and his local mask bits. Thus, we see that the
altered method in this paragraph is only good for a changed problem in which the outcome of the computation is at
least partially on Bob’s side. Bob may use some output bits on his side to check that Alice has cheated or not. Such
changed problem is a type of general bipartite computing problem, while the original problem is a more restrictive
one.
The protocol in the previous paragraph hints at a different approach to the original problem: let Bob act as the
first party in the instances of Scheme 6 for evaluating the linear polynomials, and treat his classical program as his
data; and Alice’s data is treated as her program. Then, since the final result is on Alice’s side, this case matches the
situation in the previous paragraph. Alice’s input is not too secure after many evaluations of the linear polynomials.
But in the case that the output is only one bit, we may postpone the local evaluation of linear polynomials to the
end of the overall protocol, to do a one-level locking scheme (Scheme 7 with k = 1, but with the sending of the mask
bit omitted) at the end, so that Alice only leaks a constant number of bits (2 bits) to Bob, while Bob’s circuit is
not completely known to Alice. Finally Bob sends Alice a mask bit for her to obtain the final outcome. This is very
different from the security characteristics obtained in the protocols in the previous paragraphs, in which Alice’s data
is asymptotically secure. The data privacy is partial, similar to that obtainable by Scheme 5, but note that success
is guaranteed here, while Scheme 5 involves early terminations in the case that some party cheats; but the output
size here is limited to one bit (or a constant number of bits if we allow Alice to leak a constant number of bits of
information about her data), while Scheme 5 allows the output size to be comparable to input size. The protocol here
also assumes that Bob’s circuit is quite random within the possible choices, which is a reasonable assumption.
For the interactive QHE problem, the methods above do not directly apply, since quantum information cannot be
copied in general.
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have constructed a quantum homomorphic encryption scheme for a restricted type of circuits
with perfect data privacy for real product input states. We then constructed a QHE scheme for a larger class of
polynomial-depth quantum circuits, which has partial data privacy. Both schemes have good circuit privacy. The
entanglement and classical communication costs scale linearly with the product of input size and circuit depth. We
then introduced the interactive Scheme 4 for general polynomial-sized quantum circuits, which has asymptotic data
privacy, but the circuit privacy is not good. We proposed Scheme 5 for improving circuit privacy by embedded
verifications, while the data privacy is good except for a leak of a constant number of bits. It works for the case that
the input size is larger than some constant determined by the security requirements. Finally, we present some schemes
for computing classical linear polynomials which achieve some nontrivial level of data privacy and circuit privacy, and
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show applications in partially secure evaluation of classical functions and some special case of the QHE problem.
The reason why rebits are used in Schemes 1 and 2 here is to avoid data leakage: if qubits with complex amplitudes
are used, after some measurements are done on the Alice side in the protocol, and the outcomes are sent to Bob, it is
often the case that some information about the data would have been sent to Bob. It would be good to understand
better the “phase qubit” and its possible applications. It would also be good to combine the techniques in Schemes 1
and 2 with other schemes to yield some interesting protocol, not necessary for the QHE problem.
Some further issues to investigate include: a better characterization of the type of circuits allowed in Scheme 2;
better characterization of the security of the schemes for evaluation of classical linear polynomials; how to optimize
the schemes for particular sets of allowed circuits; how to turn Scheme 4 into a non-interactive scheme (possibly
restricting the type of circuits or with compromise on security); how to make the schemes fault-tolerant; whether
there are corresponding schemes in the measurement-based computing model. In view of the results on classical-client
blind quantum computing by Mantri et al [19], and computationally-secure QHE scheme with almost classical client
[10], we may ask whether there is a QHE scheme with some nontrivial level of information-theoretic data privacy and
circuit privacy for polynomial-sized circuits, satisfying that one of the parties is fully classical.
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Appendix A: Proof of data privacy in Schemes 1 and 2
(1). Proof for Theorem 1.
Proof. Alice’s measurement outcomes in the gate gadgets are uniformly random and independent. In the following we
argue that Alice’s fixed gates, gate gadgets together with sending of her measurement outcomes to Bob do not reveal
information about the data. As a preparation, since Alice’s measurement outcomes can be compensated by Z gates
on Bob’s qubits, we may remove Alice’s qubit in the EPR pair in the gate gadgets and directly link Bob’s qubit in
the gadget with Alice’s data qubit with a controlled-iσy gate.
After the above preparation, the fixed gates and the gate gadgets on Alice’s side contain only Clifford gates. This
means that if we apply some initial Ry(π) operator on Alice’s input qubits, they will “commute” through the circuit
with Pauli corrections on all the qubits, including Bob’s qubits. Since Bob’s qubits only interact with Alice’s qubits
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via the controlled-iσy gates, it can be found that any nontrivial Pauli correction on Bob’s qubits can only be Z up to
a phase. For each input data qubit, there is a subset of Bob’s qubits that is subject to Z corrections resulting from the
X operator on the associated Alice’s qubit, which is due to initial Ry(π) on that input data qubit. An initial Ry(π) on
the phase qubit does not change Bob’s reduced density operator. Since Bob’s qubits are connected to Alice’s part of
the circuit via the controlled-iσy gates, the Z-basis information of each Bob’s qubit is reflected in Alice’s part of the
circuit as a choice of I or Ry(π). Let us consider the reduced density operator of Bob’s. We argue that the off-diagonal
terms are such that they are insensitive to the Z gates induced by Alice’s initial Ry(π) masks (the diagonal terms
are trivially so, since Z only applies phases on the computational-basis states). Consider an off-diagonal term of the
form |(gi)〉〈(hi)|, where |(gi)〉 is the short-hand notation for |g1〉|g2〉 . . . |gm〉, where g1, g2, . . . , gm are bits, and m is
the total number of Bob’s qubits. Note that the Z gates induced by a fixed initial mask pattern [Ry(π) on some input
data qubits] may only bring a sign to this off-diagonal term when
m∑
i=1
(g′i + h
′
i) mod 2 = 1, (A1)
where g′i = gi when the qubit i is subject to the Z correction resulting from this mask pattern, and g
′
i = 0 otherwise;
the h′i is similarly defined.
The two bit strings (gi) and (hi) correspond to two patterns of Ry(π)’s in Alice’s part of the circuit. In order to
calculate the coefficient for the off-diagonal term |(gi)〉〈(hi)|, we need to calculate the partial trace on Alice’s side.
Consider using the circuit diagram of Alice’s side with the target qubits in controlled-iσy gates replaced with Ry(π)
when the corresponding gi = 1, and another circuit diagram similarly obtained using the bits hi instead of the gi. The
partial trace is usually calculated by using a concatenated circuit with the output ends of the two original circuits
connected on each qubit line. Since it is symmetric, we may instead consider a “difference” circuit where the Ry(π)
appears at the qubit originally linked to Bob’s i-th qubit when
(gi + hi) mod 2 = 1. (A2)
Suppose some initial mask pattern changes an off-diagonal term of the form |(gi)〉〈(hi)| in Bob’s reduced density
operator, then it must be that this term does not vanish. We now prove that the term satisfying Eq. (A1) must
vanish, then we will get that no initial mask pattern may change an off-diagonal term. Note that when we commute
X or Ry(π) gates through a data qubit line in the circuit, they either preserve themselves (with possible corrections
on neighboring qubits) or swap with each other. Thus, only an even number of Ry(π) operators on a qubit line may
cancel out after commuting them on this line. If there is a qubit line on which the Ry(π) operators resulting from
nonzero gi and hi cancel out [it must be that their resulting Ry(π) operators on the phase-qubit line also cancel out],
then we may remove these operators, and change these gi and hi (and associated g
′
i and h
′
i, if any) to zero, without
affecting Eqs. (A1) and (A2) (which is due to the definition of g′i and h
′
i and the types of gates in the circuit), and
look at a reduced case with fewer nonzero gi and hi. After these reductions, we have that on at least one qubit line,
the operators do not cancel out. [If no such line exists, Eq. A1 is violated.] We may cancel out the Ry(π) operators
on the same line in pairs, without affecting the two equations, so that only one or two operators remain on each line.
On each data qubit other than the first data qubit, either there is no correction operator, in which case this line can
be removed without affecting the two equations, or there is only one Ry(π) operator, which when applied on the real
input state on that data qubit would give rise to zero trace on Alice’s side. Now we consider the operators on the
first data qubit and the phase qubit. Since we only consider those off-diagonal terms satisfying Eq. (A1), the joint
operator on these two qubits (corresponding to such off-diagonal term) must be one of the following: X ⊗ Ry(π), or
Z ⊗ Ry(π). Since the initial state on these two qubits are real, it can be found that these operators map the initial
state to an orthogonal state. Therefore the partial trace on Alice side is zero, which implies that the term satisfying
Eq. (A1) must vanish. Thus it must be that no initial mask pattern may change any off-diagonal term in Bob’s
reduced density operator.
In the above, we have shown that for any pure input state of the required type, and its Ry(π)-padded states [“Ry(π)-
padded” means that there are Ry(π) gates applied on some of the qubits, possibly including the phase qubit], the
reduced density operators of Bob’s system after correcting for Alice’s measurement outcomes are the same. Thus,
for a subset of such input states, namely real product states, Bob’s reduced density operator is equal to that for
the input being the average state of all Ry(π)-padded states, which is a fixed maximally-mixed state. Thus, these
reduced density operators of Bob’s are fixed regardless of what the pure input state is. Thus Bob does not receive any
information about the input data in the case that the input state is restricted to be a real product state. For the other
type of input pure state, that is, the tensor product of an arbitrary two-qubit real state on the first data qubit and
the phase qubit, and a real product state of other data qubits, we can similarly consider applying initial Z or X masks
to the first data qubit of the input state, and Ry(π) masks on other data qubits, and similarly find that such initial
mask pattern does not change any off-diagonal term in Bob’s reduced density operator. By considering initial Pauli
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masks on the phase qubit, we find that all possible Pauli masks on the phase qubit does not change Bob’s reduced
density operator. Consequently, all possible Pauli masks on the first data qubit and the phase qubit does not change
Bob’s reduced density operator. Therefore, the logical input state of the first qubit (encoded on the first data qubit
and the phase qubit) does not affect Bob’s reduced density operator. The Ry(π) masks on other data qubits still do
not matter. This implies that Bob receives no information about the input, for pure input states of the required type.
The case of probabilistic mixture of such states follows by linearity. This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
(2). Proof for Theorem 2.
Proof. (i) As in the proof of Theorem 1, to consider a change from one of the two input states to the other, we
only need to consider applying Ry(π) on each data qubit and a Ry(θ) on the phase qubit. These operators commute
through the circuit, and they sometimes become X operators, resulting in some Z operators on some of Bob’s qubits.
Consider an off-diagonal term in Bob’s reduced density matrix. Such term does not vanish if and only if some Ry(π)
operators on some data-qubit lines in some “difference” circuit commute back to the beginning of the circuit and meet
with the input state to yield nonzero trace on Alice’s side. The operators at the beginning of the circuit is always
a product operator, and if Ry(π) appears on the phase qubit, the type of input state in the assertion to be proved
would be mapped to an orthogonal state, giving rise to zero trace on Alice’s side. The case of nonzero trace only
occurs when there are an even number of Ry(π) in the “difference” circuit that are in positions that were subject to
X operators in the original circuit (each resulting in a Z operator on one of Bob’s qubits). From Eq. A1, this means
that Bob’s off-diagonal term does not vanish only when it is not affected by the choice of input state (between the
two possible input states). Thus, Bob’s reduced density matrix is independent of the choice of input state (between
the two possible input states).
(ii) The argument follows from the proof of Theorem 1, including the “averaging” argument in the last paragraph
of the proof of Theorem 1. The one-qubit Pauli operators on the data qubit in the proof of Theorem 1 are replaced
with operators on some data qubits here. In particular, the initial logical Ry(π) on n data qubits (where n is odd) is
regarded as Ry(π) on all data qubits. The initial logical Z on n data qubits is regarded as Z on all data qubits. The
assumption of n being odd is essential, since Ry(π) on an even number of qubits is not the logical Ry(π), under the
current encoding of |0〉 and |1〉 into |0〉⊗n and |1〉⊗n, respectively. It follows from the above types of correspondences
of Pauli operators that the first n qubits of the two encoded states could also be any computational-basis state and
X⊗n acting on such state. This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Appendix B: The garden-hose gadget that corrects an unwanted P gate
The Fig. 2 below shows a simplified version of a gadget in [8] for correcting an unwanted P gate due to a T gate in
the circuit with certain prior Pauli corrections. The input qubit starts from the position “in”, and ends up in a qubit
on Bob’s side labeled “out1” or “out2”, depending on Bob’s input bit p. The unwanted P on this qubit is corrected,
but some other Pauli corrections are now needed because of the Bell-state measurements. These Pauli corrections are
to be accounted for in the later evaluation of linear polynomials in the instances of Scheme 3 in the main Scheme 4.
Note that in each use of this gadget, some of the Bell-state measurements are not actually performed, dependent on
the value of p and q; and that Alice’s Bell-state measurements are on the same pairs of qubits irrespective of q.
Appendix C: Classical mutual information in the case of uniformly distributed data in Scheme 6
This appendix complements Theorem 5. We consider the classical mutual information under the condition that
Alice’s input distribution is uniformly random. Such quantity is abbreviated as CMI below.
First, we show that in the case k = 1 in Scheme 6, the CMI between Alice’s input and Bob received state is n−1+ 12n
bits.
The construction of the scheme implies that Bob should always measure the first qubit in each pair in the Z basis,
and the second qubit in each pair in the X basis, to get maximal information about the data. In the following, we
assume that Bob indeed does such measurements, and regard the outcomes as the classical bits obtained by Bob. Since
the input and output are both effectively classical, the classical mutual information is equal to the Holevo quantity.
Thus, a direct calculation of the Holevo quantity should give the CMI. In the following we give an alternative way of
calculating the CMI in the case of k = 1 with uniformly distributed data.
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FIG. 2: A simplified version of a gadget in [8] for applying a P† to a qubit initially at the position “in” if and only if
p + q = 1 (mod 2), using the “garden hose” method. The dots connected by wavy lines are EPR pairs. The curved lines are
for Bell-state measurements. For example, if p = 0 and q = 1, the qubit is teleported through the first and the third EPR
pairs, with a P† applied to it by Alice in between. The state of the input qubit always ends up in a qubit on Bob’s side, and
the position depends on Bob’s input bit p: if p = 0, the output is on the qubit labeled “out1”, otherwise it is on the qubit
labeled “out2”. Note that in each use of this gadget, only 3 Bell-state measurements are actually performed; Alice’s Bell-state
measurements are on the same pairs qubits irrespective of q.
Since the input distribution is uniformly random, the bits received by Bob are uniformly random. For each input bit
xi, there is one half probability that the corresponding two bits obtained by Bob is 00 or 11. In such case, the bit xi is
determined. In other cases, two input bits xi and xj may be correlated. This can happen when the two bits obtained
by Bob are 01 or 10, for both xi and xj . The contribution to the overall mutual information is
1
4 bits, because the
case just mentioned happens with probability 14 . If we add up all C
2
n such pairs, there is some overcounting. We may
subtract the three-pair coincidences, then add back the four-pair coincidences, etc, and get the following expression
for the classical mutual information:
n
2
+
n∑
j=2
(−1)j
2j
Cjn
=
n
2
+ (1− 1
2
)n − 1 + n
2
= n− 1 + 1
2n
(bits) (C1)
In the following we discuss the general case of k > 1 in Scheme 6. Let us first look at the special case of n = k = 2.
For each input bit xi, there is one half probability that the corresponding two bits obtained by Bob for each qubit
is 01 or 10. For the input bit xi, the probability that both pairs of bits obtained by Bob are 00 or 11 is
1
4 , which
contributes 14 bits of information to the CMI, and two input bits contribute
1
2 bits in total. For each input bit xi,
the probability that both pairs of bits obtained by Bob are 01 or 10 is 14 . If both the bits for x1 and x2 satisfy this,
Bob gets 1 bit of information about the correlation between the two input bits. This gives 116 bits of contribution to
the CMI. The same amount of correlation information may also be obtained by Bob when the two pairs of bits for
x1 obtained by Bob contain exactly one pair being 01 or 10, and exactly the same happens for x2 with the 01 or 10
in the same position labeled by j in Scheme 6. Such cases give 2 × 116 bits of contribution to the CMI. The overall
CMI in the case n = k = 2 is 12 + 3 × (14 )2 = 1116 bits, where 3 = 22 − 1, with the explanation being that the case
of both input bits correspond to 00 or 11 at every position is excluded. By the similar argument, For general k and
fixed n = 2, the CMI is 2
2k
+ 2
k−1
22k
= 3
2k
− 1
22k
bits.
For n > 2 and general k, we may combine the methods for the case of n > 2 and k = 1, and the case of n = 2 and
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general k, and obtain that the part of CMI induced by the single-bit and two-bit correlations among {xi} is
n
2k
+
n∑
j=2
(−1)j 2
k − 1
2jk
Cjn
=
n
2k
+ (2k − 1)[(1− 1
2k
)n − 1 + n
2k
]
= n− (2k − 1)[1− (1 − 1
2k
)n] (bits). (C2)
When n and k are large, and k > C log2 n for some constant C > 2, the expression above is O(
n2
2k
) bits. But multi-bit
correlations are ignored above. To consider the effect of multi-bit correlations, note that the linear correlations among
some subset of {xi} is learnable by Bob if and only if the corresponding vectors are linearly dependent, where the
vector for a xi is defined as a length-k bit string, and each nonzero bit in such string represents that some pair of bits
obtained by Bob is 01 or 10 (as opposed to 00 or 11). When n = k and both are large, the n bit strings contain, on
average, about a constant number of linearly dependent strings. Hence, we estimate that the CMI is about a constant
number of bits when n = k and both are large. For the case that k is much larger than n, say when k = ⌈γn⌉ with
the constant γ > 43 , we estimate that the number of linearly dependent strings are zero, thus the CMI is near zero.
The CMI in this case is O(poly(n)2k−n ) bits, as the contribution from multi-bit correlations is not negligible compared to
that of two-bit correlations. But the circuit privacy is quite bad in this case, since k > n; such parameter range may
still be interesting due to the possible methods of verifications by Alice, or in the case discussed in Sec. VIII.
